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ABSTRACT
This thesis employs multi-period overlapping generations (OLG) models with aggre-
gate risk to study questions at the interface of macroeconomics, public nance, and
nance.
The rst chapter addresses the equity premium puzzle. The equity premium
puzzle refers to the inability of standard models to reproduce the large dierence,
on average, between the returns to risky and safe assets observed in the data. First
proposed three decades ago, this puzzle has remained a challenge to economics. A
large literature has tried to resolve it using complex machinery, such as nonstandard
preferences or risk structures. I show that to resolve the puzzle it suces to impose
increasing marginal costs of borrowing in an otherwise standard OLG model.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Laurence Kotliko, we quantify the size
of generational risk in an 80-period OLG model for the rst time. Generational risk is
the extent to which aggregate shocks are spread across contemporaneous generations.
Under prefect risk-sharing, the consumption of all generations changes by the same
percentage when a shock hits. The deviation from that perfect risk-sharing world is a
iv
measure of generational risk. Contrary to standard assumptions in the literature, we
nd that generational risk is small and that government policy can easily exacerbate
it. We also show that a bond market can mitigate risk-inducing policy.
In the third chapter, also co-authored with Kotliko, we consider a long-standing
problem: how to value government obligations when markets are incomplete. Our
approach consists of determining the current wealth equivalent of future government
promises using the change in remaining expected lifetime utility converted into current
consumption units. We nd that discount rates for policies involving sure payments
each period to the elderly aren't uniform over time or agents of dierent cohorts. They
also depend on the size of the payments and attendant general equilibrium eects.
For innitesimal promises, the discount rates are remarkably close to the prevailing
short-term interest rate.
A technical contribution of this thesis is solving models like the above for the rst
time, by employing and extending Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2011).
v
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis focuses on scal policies and asset prices. The scal policies it considers
are take-as-you-go, intergenerational redistribution policies, where government takes
from the workers to give to the contemporaneous elderly. They are a fundamental
aspect of a nation's scal aairs. Examples include the Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid systems in the United States. Life-cycle simulation models are critical to
the ne-tuning of these policies. Indeed, the Board of Trustees of the Social Security
trust funds relies on several such models in its assessment of the nancial condition
of the programs it oversees.
The framework it employs is overlapping generations models with aggregate risk.
The presence of overlapping generations is essential for the study of scal policies.
An obvious reason is that multiple generations have to be alive simultaneously for
any redistribution among them to be possible. Another reason is the strong empirical
evidence against intergenerational altruism. For example, Gokhale, Kotliko, and
Sabelhaus (1996) and Kotliko (2006) estimate that the per capita consumption of
middle-aged retirees relative to that of middle-aged workers has more than doubled
since 1960. As a result, dierent generations bear dierent scal burdens and are also
aected dierently by general equilibrium eects. This would not be captured by a
representative agent model, which lumps all generations into a single, innitely-lived
2one. Moreover, previous work indicates that overlapping generation models may be
a key to understanding asset pricing anomalies.
Incorporating aggregate risk is also essential for this study, because aggregate risk
cannot be eliminated by risk sharing within or across generations. Intergenerational
redistribution policies involve reallocating this risk across generations in order to
reduce their consumption risk in old age. And, of course, without aggregate risk the
returns on the safe and the risky assets would be equal, and any study of risk premia
(the dierence in the two returns) impossible. To model aggregate risk realistically,
this thesis follows the real business cycle literature.
Prior to my work with Laurence Kotliko in 2013, which builds on the break-
through general framework of Kenneth Judd, Serguei Maliar, and Lilia Maliar (2011),
economists have not been able to solve such models because of the well-known curse
of dimensionality. This curse arises when the economy in question has a large num-
ber of state variables. If, for example, agents live for 80 periods (referencing ages 20
through 100), the state variables are 80 age-specic asset-holding levels (one for each
of the 80 cohorts) plus the productivity shock and the shock to the return on capital
(captured in the form of a stochastic rate of depreciation). Solving a model with
this number of state variables has, heretofore, been impossible because one needs to
work out consumption and labor supply choices of each cohort as functions of these
variables, and these functions need to be mutually consistent. That is, one needs to
nd a xed point in the function space across 160 functions, each of which depends
on 82 variables. Mutual consistency here entails having each of the Euler conditions
governing intertemporal and static consumption and labor choices to hold simultane-
ously. But using traditional grid search methods or sophisticated sparse grid methods
(as per the work of Dirk Krueger and Felix Kubler) entails so many calculations as
3to defeat even the world's most powerful supercomputers. Judd, Maliar, and Maliar,
extending the foundational work of Marcet (1988), forego solving for the model's be-
havior in states that will never or essentially never materialize given the ergodicity
of the stochastic process driving the economy as well as its initial conditions. This
limits the required computation and eectively banishes the dimensionality curse.
A technical contribution of this thesis is extending the Judd, Maliar, and Maliar
method to work for models with up to 80 overlapping generations and a variety of mar-
ket structures. A short-hand description of this new approach would be the Auerbach-
Kotliko (1987) life-cycle simulation model but solved with macroeconomic uctua-
tions. This extension permits economists to tackle a variety of long-standing ques-
tions. For example, we can now make advances in understanding how economies with
overlapping generations, facing scal policies and reasonable demographics, will evolve
and respond to shocks. Moreover, this new model is fundamentally micro based|it
can be calibrated using micro-level empirical evidence|but it is also equipped to
reveal macroeconomic impacts of microeconomic decisions, i.e., the bigger picture.
This thesis explores three main avenues in these directions|asset prices in standard
life-cycle models, generational risk, and the sustainability of scal policies|described
in turn in Sections 1.1{1.3 and Chapters 2{4.
1.1 Asset Prices in Standard Life-Cycle Models
The U.S. equity premium|the dierence between the mean return on U.S. stocks
(the market portfolio) and short-term Treasuries (3-month T-Bills)|has averaged 6
percent on an annual basis, since 1925. The average risk-free rate during this period
has averaged 1 percent. In their seminal paper Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that
4a reasonably calibrated representative-agent model produces an equity premium of
at most 0:35 percent and a risk-free rate of 4 percent|hence the famous \equity
premium puzzle".
A large literature has tried to resolve the puzzle, invoking a lot of machinery.
But in Chapter 2, I show that resolving the puzzle appears to be straightforward,
at least in a multi-period overlapping generations setting. My base model is quite
simple: it features isoelastic preferences with modest risk aversion of 2, Cobb-Douglas
production technology, and realistic shocks. The critical extra ingredient needed
to produce sizable equity premiums is increasing cost of supplying bonds, i.e., of
borrowing. Such costs are in line with the empirical evidence of Scott (1996), who
nds that the most appropriate way of modeling agents' borrowing opportunities is
by an upward-sloping interest rate schedule.
Absent borrowing costs, the risk-free rate is just as high as the rate of return on
capital (which, in these models, is determined by the saving behavior of the young,
i.e., their time preference rate), and the equity premium is extremely small. Adding
the costs reduces the private supply of bonds dramatically, increasing the bond price
and lowering the equilibrium safe rate. Crucially, for this to happen all generations
need to face borrowing costs at the margin. Otherwise, the low-cost supplier ends up
supplying all the bonds, and the equity premium disappears.
My results contrast the seminal work of Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra
(2002). In their three-period, pure-exchange model, hard borrowing constraints on
the young suce for large equity premiums. This dierence between my ndings and
theirs highlights the importance of more robust and realistic models in developing
theories that match the real world.
51.2 Generational Risk
One denition of generational risk, rst proposed by Abel and Kotliko (1988), is
the extent to which aggregate shocks are spread across generations who are con-
temporaneously alive. Intuitively, in a prefect risk-sharing world, each generation's
consumption is based on overall resources, i.e., the shocks are spread uniformly among
them. Given the preference structure I employ (time-separability and homotheticity),
this entails changing the consumption of all generations by the same percentage. The
deviation from that perfect risk-sharing world|how much the actual percent changes
in consumption dier from uniform percent changes|can serve as a measure of gen-
erational risk. Another measure involves comparing generations from the original,
Rawlsian position (before they have been born). In particular, we can ask what the
dierences in their expected lifetime utilities would be should they be born at dierent
dates and therefore dierent states of the world. A third way to measure generational
risk is to compare the realized lifetime utilities across generations.
Armed with these denitions, in Chapter 3, co-authored with Laurence Kotliko,
we quantify the size of generational risk for the rst time. A large theoretical literature
on generational risk presumes that it is large and that government can eectively
share it. Yet, no previous study has assessed its magnitude quantitatively. Perhaps
surprisingly, we nd that generational risk is wildly overrated. Moreover, since there is
little risk to share, the government has limited scope in pooling risk across generations
using intergenerational redistribution. In fact, we nd that government take-as-you-
go policy can easily manufacture, rather than mitigate generational risk. We also
study the degree to which capital markets facilitate risk sharing across generations
and represent a substitute for government generational risk sharing.
6Our results show that the main determinant of the economy's future position
is not the shocks it experiences, but rather the manner and extent to which the
government redistributes resources across generations. They echo other ndings in
the literature suggesting that macroeconomic uctuations are too small to have major
microeconomic consequences.
1.3 Sustainability of Fiscal Policies
In this line of inquiry, I focus on assessing the size and the economic impact of scal
decits. The scal decit is widely considered as the most daunting economic problem
of the United States. Yet, there is no consensus on how to measure it. A critical point
of conict is whether to include and how to value government obligations labeled as
unocial, such as future pension payments or medical benets. Indeed, by making
these I.O.U.s non-fungible, governments ensure that they can't readily be priced. How
then can we determine the degree to which a government has promised more than it
can deliver? Stated dierently, how should we discount future government obligations
(including negative obligations, i.e., taxes), no matter their title, when markets are
incomplete?
In Chapter 4, co-authored with Laurence Kotliko, we propose an answer. It
consists of determining the current wealth equivalent of future government promises
using a familiar metric|the change in remaining expected lifetime utility converted
into current consumption units. Doing so is relatively straightforward for current
generations. But what about future generations? Our approach is to treat future
generations as if they are already alive, but simply have no utility in periods not just
after, but also before their physical existence.
7We nd that the appropriate scal discount rates to be applied to promises of
future payments depend on the agent's age, the state of the economy, the size of
the payments, the riskiness of the policy, and whether the promises incorporate the
general equilibrium eects of the promised payments. For innitesimal payments,
which have no general equilibrium feedback eects, the discount rates are, surpris-
ingly, remarkably close to the economy's prevailing safe short-term rate of return.
This nding provides some support for standard government practice of discounting
rmly promised future benets and taxes, such as those associated with the Social
Security system, at a xed rate.
In principle, our method of determining discount rates applicable to specic gov-
ernment payments, be they positive or negative (i.e., taxes) or safe or risky, could be
used to improve scal gap accounting. Governments can use a realistic version of this
model to value their obligations and quantify how much they would hurt dierent
generations if they were to renege on their promises to them. Alternatively, they
can understand what burdens they will inict on generations they make pay these
obligations.
8Chapter 2
Borrowing Costs and the Equity Premium
in Standard OLG Models
2.1 Introduction
The U.S. equity premium|the dierence between the mean return on U.S. stocks
(the market portfolio) and short-term Treasuries (3-month T-Bills)|has averaged 6
percent on an annual basis, since 1925. The average risk-free rate during this period
has averaged 1 percent. In their seminal paper Mehra and Prescott (1985) showed
that a reasonably calibrated representative-agent model produces an equity premium
of at most 0:35 percent and a risk-free rate of 4 percent|hence the \equity premium
puzzle".
A large literature has tried to resolve the puzzle, invoking a lot of machinery.
For example, hard borrowing constraints were used by Constantinides, Donaldson,
and Mehra (2002). Alternative preferences were used by Constantinides (1990), Abel
(1990), Epstein and Zin (1991), Jermann (1997), Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
Campbell (2001), Ju and Miao (2012), and Liu and Miao (2014). Capital frictions
were used by Jermann (1997), Tallarini (2000), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001),
and Liu and Miao (2014). Rare disasters in technology processes were used by Rietz
(1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2012), and Wachter (2013). Signicant stochastic de-
9preciation shocks were used by Krueger and Kubler (2006). Non-fundamental shocks
(sunspots) were used by Farmer (2014). Finally, behavioral models, such as those
based on prospect theory, were used by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). See also
the survey by Mehra (2006) and the references therein.
This paper shows that borrowing costs, which are rapidly rising in the amount
borrowed, imbedded in an otherwise standard general equilibrium overlapping gener-
ation (OLG) model, can easily generate a sizable equity premium. The model features
ten periods (referencing ages 20 to 80), isoelastic preferences with risk aversion of 2,
Cobb-Douglas production, and realistically calibrated total factor productivity (TFP)
shocks. It also includes government consumption at 20 percent of GDP and pay-as-
you-go social security. The model features no government debt, but can be relabeled
(see Green and Kotliko, 2008) to have as much or as little debt as desired.
In the model, agents work prior to retirement and rent capital to rms. They
are uncertain about the compensation accruing to their supplies of labor and capital
due to the uncertainty about the economy's future productivity. However, they are
aected dierently by this uncertainty, since they are in dierent stages in their life
cycle and hence possess human and physical capital in dierent proportions. To
hedge their labor and capital income risks, they save and invest in risky capital and
borrow and lend from each other in the private market for one-period safe bonds.
Borrowing costs imply a wedge between the borrowing and lending rates. These costs
are specied exogenously and are increasing, in a convex fashion, in the size of the
loan.
Absent borrowing costs, the model's equity premium is extremely small. This is
due to the fact that the risk-free rate is just as high as the rate of return on capital,
which is set at a reasonable value by the saving behavior of the young (i.e., their time
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preference rate). By contrast, borrowing costs reduce the private supply of bonds
dramatically, increasing the bond price and lowering the safe rate of return. The
equity premium rises from essentially zero without borrowing costs to over 5 percent
with them, and the risk-free rate declines from roughly 6 { 8 percent to roughly 1 {
2:5 percent.
The denition of equity premium employed in this paper is the equilibrium gap
between the mean return to capital and the return to risk-free bonds, rather than
this gap per unit of risk. This is in the space of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and
Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002). For example, Mehra and Prescott
(1985) stress that while their exercise is well suited for addressing this equilibrium
gap, it is poorly suited for other issues, in particular issues such as the volatility
of asset prices. That is because in their paper, like in this one, the risky asset
traded is the claim to the entire capital in the economy, rather than just to corporate
dividends. The return to the economy's total capital stock is not highly volatile
because a signicant fraction of it is government infrastructure.1
Although it is not needed to generate equity premium, including modest capital
depreciation shocks or capital adjustment costs allows the model to emit a pattern
of increasing bond holdings by age. Without either of these features, the old are
the borrowers (the suppliers), with them they are the lenders (the demanders) of
bonds. This is because capital depreciation shocks and capital adjustment costs
expose investment principal to risk. Since, for the elderly, the only source of income
is their investments, they demand bonds when the principal is risky, otherwise they
supply them.
1Government infrastructure includes bridges, highways, water systems, schools, etc. According
to the COB's estimates, in 2004 the US invested 400 billion dollars in this type of capital.
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The model builds on Hasanhodzic and Kotliko (2013) by adding borrowing costs,
stochastic depreciation, and capital adjustment costs. Like that paper's, its solution
method relies on the general framework of Judd, Maliar, and Maliar's (2009, 2011)
algorithm|a numerically stable and accurate extension of Marcet (1988)|to over-
come the curse of dimensionality.2
Comparison to Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002)
Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) posit a three-period OLG model
with pure exchange and a hard borrowing constraint on the young to resolve the
equity premium puzzle. They justify this constraint based on the inability of the
young to borrow against their future earnings. The authors suggest that their results
would also hold in more realistic extensions, as long as the young face hard borrowing
constraints. The extensions they mention include a larger number of generations,
standard technology, and the inclusion of government policy.
Recall that this paper features ten, not three generations, Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology, and government spending and generational policy. But it assumes soft, but
rapidly rising borrowing costs, which seem more realistic (see the next subsection).
Interestingly, limiting the borrowing costs to a subset of generations does not have
the eect of lowering the risk-free rate and increasing the equity premium. Only when
all generations face the costs does the supply of bonds become limited enough for the
risk-free rate to decline substantially and the equity premium to emerge. Indeed, even
if there is a single generation that is unconstrained, it becomes the low-cost supplier
of bonds to the economy and hence the marginal investor relevant for their pricing.
This makes perfect sense in light of the nding by Hasanhodzic and Kotliko (2013)
2See Chapter 3 for an overview of the solution algorithm.
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of minimal dierences across generations in standard, realistically-calibrated models.
Borrowing Costs
Representing agents' borrowing opportunities via soft, but rising borrowing costs
seems a reasonable alternative to hard borrowing constraints, which prevent borrow-
ing altogether. Most households appear able to borrow very small amounts at low
rates. But taking out more sizable loans on an unsecured basis entails credit card-level
interest rates.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence of Scott (1996), who documents sig-
nicant variation in interest rates charged on unsecured loans in the U.K. Specically,
he nds that the deposit rates are less than half the interest rates on bank personal
loans, that the latter are signicantly lower than credit card rates, which in turn are
lower than retail loan rates. He then shows that individuals should rationally rst use
bank personal loans, only when that is no longer available turn to credit cards, and
only when those are exhausted resort to retail cards. He concludes that \the most
appropriate way of modeling agents' borrowing opportunities is by an upward-sloping
interest rate schedule" (page 2). In other words, as an individual's debt increases,
their marginal borrowing rate rises.
Scott (1996) further suggests that such representation is consistent with the the-
oretical model of Milde and Riley (1988), where banks screen borrowers by oering
larger loans at higher interest rates and borrowers signal their quality by accepting
larger loans at higher interest rates. Another theoretical model which predicts that
the cost of borrowing increases with the size of the loan is Chatterjee, Corbae, Naka-
jima, and Rios-Rull (2007). In that paper, a larger loan commands a higher interest
rate since it induces a higher probability of default, and the intermediaries who make
13
unsecured loans take this probability into account.3
Although not modeled explicitly in order to explore the eect of borrowing costs
on the risk-free rate in a parsimonious paradigm, the default risk is at the heart of
increasing marginal borrowing costs in this paper as well. Because of it, as well as due
to informational time-consistency issues, the intermediary exerts eort to verify the
borrower's creditworthiness. Moreover, the larger is the amount borrowed, the higher
is the risk of default, and the more resources are committed to ensuring more precise
verication of the agent's creditworthiness. For example, FICO scores, tax returns,
conversations with employers, interviews with the borrower, and the appraisals of the
borrower's property may be added successively to the checklist as the size of the loan
increases. In addition, the larger is the amount borrowed, the greater is the labor
supplied by the borrower who processes the paperwork and proves the validity of their
identity to the intermediary. As a result, in intermediation there exist two interest
rates: one that the intermediary receives, and another one that the borrower pays in
interest. For example, a borrower may be paying a credit card rate of 25 percent,
while the ultimate sources of funds (the owners of the corporation) may be getting
5 percent|the dierence is interpreted as real resources consumed in the process of
intermediation.
As one would expect, the steeper is the interest rate schedule, the smaller is the
gross bond supply, the lower is the risk-free rate, and the larger is the equity premium.
For example, in the equilibrium with the risk-free rate of roughly 1 { 2:5 percent and
the equity premium of roughly 5 percent, the ratio of the marginal borrowing cost to
the risk-free rate is typically 15 to 1. This seems reasonable. It is not uncommon for
3Other studies permit the borrowing rate to increase in the amount borrowed in various contexts,
see, e.g., Altonji and Siow (1987), Wirjanto (1995), and Fernandez-Corugedo (2002).
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credit card companies to charge 20 percent interest rates, a ratio, again, of roughly
15 to 1 with the risk-free rate of 1 { 2 percent. Even for someone who is very rich, has
excellent credit score, owns a million dollar house (on which the mortgage company
owns the insurance policy), a rate on an eectively very small home equity loan is at
least 10 times higher than the 1-year T-Bill rate. The reason is the inability of the
lender to observe what the borrower's actions may be at some point in the future.
But in the equilibrium where this ratio is typically 2 to 1, the risk-free rate and the
equity premium are roughly 3 { 4:5 percent and 3 percent, respectively.
Another measure of the plausibility of these borrowing costs is how much the
welfare changes when they are introduced. It changes very little, suggesting that
they are not implausible. The reason is that realistically calibrated aggregate or
macroeconomic risk is too small to have signicant microeconomic consequences, as
documented by Lucas (1987), Krusell and Smith (1999), and Hasanhodzic and Kot-
liko (2013). As a result, the agents are not eager to hold bonds even if they are
unconstrained, and large changes in the price of bonds translate into small changes
in welfare.
This paper is not the rst to introduce exogenous costs or benets to asset holding
or loan creation. For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) argue
that safe assets such as treasury debt provide a convenience yield which drives the
yield on treasuries down relative to other assets such as corporate bonds. Also,
Goodfriend (2005) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) expand a standard DSGE
model with a production function for loan creation that takes as inputs monitoring
eort and collateral, and use it to study the role of money and banking in monetary
policy analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe the model and
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its calibration. Section 4.4 presents the results, Section 3.7 conducts a sensitivity
analysis, and Section 4.5 evaluates the accuracy of solutions. Section 4.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model features G overlapping generations with shocks to total factor productiv-
ity and either capital depreciation shocks or capital adjustment costs. Each agent
works through retirement age R, dies at age G, and maximizes expected lifetime util-
ity. There is an increasing cost of supplying bonds, i.e. of borrowing. If there are
adjustment costs, rms maximize their nancial value, i.e. the present value of their
revenue ow, otherwise they maximize static prots.
2.2.1 Endowments and Preferences
The economy is populated by G overlapping generations that live from age 1 to age G.
All agents within a generation are identical and are referenced by their age g and time
t. Each cohort of workers supplies 1 unit of labor each period. Using a hump-shaped
age-earnings prole as in Hansen (1983) and Krueger and Kubler (2006), where labor
supplies by age are given by [0:624; 0:794; 0:909; 0:985; 1:032; 1:041; 1:039; 0:576; 0; 0],
does not change the results. Hence, total labor supply equals the retirement age R.
Utility is time-separable and isoelastic, with risk aversion coecient :
u(c) =
c1    1
1   : (2.1)
2.2.2 Financial Markets
Households save and invest in either risky capital or one-period safe bonds. Investing
1 unit of consumption in bonds at time t yields 1 + rt units in period t+ 1. The safe
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rate of return, rt, is indexed by t since it is known at time t although it is received at
time t+1. The total demand for assets of household age g at time t is denoted by g;t,
and its share of assets invested in bonds is denoted by g;t. Households enter period t
with g 1;t 1 in assets, which corresponds to the total assets they demanded the prior
period. Since investment decisions are made at the end of the period, the aggregate
supply of capital in period t, Kt, is the sum of assets brought by the households into
period t, i.e.
Kt =
GX
g=1
g;t 1; (2.2)
normalized by qt 1 in the case of adjustment costs. Bonds are in zero net supply,
hence by being short (long) bonds, households are borrowing (lending) to each other.
2.2.3 Technology
Production is Cobb-Douglas with output Yt given by
Yt = ztK

t L
1 
t ; (2.3)
where z is total factor productivity,  is capital's share of output, and Lt is labor
demand, which equals R, labor supply. Equilibrium factor prices are given by
wt = zt(1  )
 PG
g=1 g;t 1
R
!
; (2.4)
rt = zt
 PG
g=1 g;t 1
R
! 1
  t; (2.5)
where depreciation t  N (; 2 ), as in Ambler and Paquet (1994).
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With capital adjustment costs, r is given by
rt =
zt(
Kt
R
) 1 + m
2
( It
Kt
)2 + qt   qt 1
qt 1
; (2.6)
where qt = 1 + m
It
Kt
is the price of capital, Kt =
PG
g=1 g;t 1
qt 1
is the capital stock,
It = Kt+1  Kt is the investment at time t, and m is the adjustment cost parameter
(see, e.g., Auerbach and Kotliko, 1987 and the references therein).
Total factor productivity, z, obeys
ln(zt+1) =  ln(zt) + t+1; (2.7)
where t+1  N (0; 2).
2.2.4 Borrowing Costs
The model's borrowing costs are implemented via a smoothing function proposed by
Chen and Mangasarian (1996). The function is smooth and rising for negative bond
holdings, and is essentially zero when bond holdings are close to zero or positive (see
Figure 2.1).
Specically, to borrow the amount of  households have to pay the borrowing
cost of f(), where
f() = 0:2

 b  1 + 1
5
ln(1 + e5b+5)

(2.8)
and b is the parameter described in Section 4.3 governing slope of f . Since f is
increasing in bond shares (), for a given level of assets () the marginal borrowing
cost is increasing in total amount borrowed ().
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Figure 2.1: Borrowing cost functions with dierent slope parameters for a xed level
of assets. The x-axis displays bond demands. Since the asset level is xed, the
functions are increasing in bond shares.
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Specifying the borrowing costs via f() rather than f() insures that the model
remains scalable: if all of the \level" variables were to double, the borrowing cost
would double as well. This specication also makes economic sense. With 2 in
assets and some , the marginal costs would be the same as with  in assets and that
same alpha, since the extra assets could be used as collateral. This is in line with
Goodfriend (2005) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), where collateral is as a
valuable input in loan production because it enables a bank to enforce the repayment
of loans with less monitoring (i.e., the greater is the borrower's collateral, the more
productive is the intermediary's monitoring eort).
2.2.5 Government
Government spending equals a xed share  of GDP each period. It is nanced by the
payroll tax  . Two types of intergenerational redistribution policy are considered: a
xed benet policy and a proportional tax policy. Under the former, the government
takes a variable share of the wage from the workers and gives a xed benet to the
elderly. Under the latter, it takes a xed share of the wage from the workers and
gives a variable amount to the elderly. The transfers to the elderly are denoted by
Ht.
2.2.6 Household Problem
Households of age g in state (s; z; ) maximize expected remaining lifetime utility
given by
Vg(s; z; ) = maxc;; fu(c) + E [Vg+1(s0; z0; 0)]g (2.9)
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subject to
c1;t = `1(1  t)wt   1;t + (1  `1)Ht; (2.10)
cg;t = `g(1  t)wt + [g 1;t 1(1 + rt 1) + (1  g 1;t 1)(1 + rt)] g 1;t 1   g;t
(2.11)
  f()g 1;t 1 + (1  `g)Ht;
for 1 < g < G; and
cG;t = `G(1  t)wt + [G 1;t 1(1 + rt 1) + (1  G 1;t 1)(1 + rt)] G 1;t 1 (2.12)
  f()G 1;t 1 + (1  `G)Ht;
where cg;t is the consumption of a g-year old at time t, t is the payroll tax nancing
government spending and transfers to the elderly, Ht is the benet given to the elderly,
and (4.9){(4.11) are budget constraints for age group 1, those between 1 and G, and
that for age group G.
2.2.7 Equilibrium
At time t, the economy's state is (st; zt; t), with st = (1;t 1; : : : ; G 1;t 1) denoting
the set of age-specic asset holdings. Given the initial state of the economy s0; z0; 0,
where s0 = (1; 1; : : : ; G 1; 1), the recursive competitive equilibrium is dened as
follows:
Denition. The recursive competitive equilibrium is governed by the collection of
the value functions and the household policy functions for total savings g(s; z; ), the
share of savings invested in bonds g(s; z; ), and consumption cg(s; z; ) for each age
group g, the choices for the representative rm K(s; z; ) and L(s; z; ), as well as the
21
pricing functions r(s; z; ), w(s; z; ), and r(s; z; ) such that:
1. Given the pricing functions, the value functions (4.8) solve the recursive problem
of the households subject to the budget constraints (4.9){(4.11), and g, g, and
cg are the associated policy functions for all g and for all dates and states.
2. Wages and rates of return on capital satisfy (4.3) and either (4.4) or (4.5),
i.e. at each point, for given w and r the rm maximizes prots if there are no
adjustment costs and maximizes the rm value otherwise.
3. All markets clear: Labor and capital market clearing conditions are implied by
Lt = R and (4.7). Since bonds are in zero net supply, bond market clearing
requires
GX
g=1
g(s; z; )g(s; z; ) = 0: (2.13)
Market clearing conditions in labor, capital, and bond markets and satisfaction
of household budgets imply market clearing in consumption.
4. The government balances its budget, i.e.,
t =
Yt +Ht(G R)
wtR
: (2.14)
Finally, for all age groups g = 1; : : : ; G   1, optimal intertemporal consumption
and investment choice satises
1 = Ez
 
1 + r(s0; z0; 0) + g(s; z; )(r(s; z; )  r(s0; z0; 0)) (2.15)
  f(g(s; z; ))
u0(cg+1(s0; z0; 0))
u0(cg(s; z; ))

and
22
0 = Ez [u
0(cg+1(s0; z0; 0))(r(s; z; )  r(s0; z0; 0)  f 0(g(s; z; )))] ; (2.16)
where Ez is the conditional expectation of z
0 given z, and f 0() = 0:2b

 1 + e5b+5
1+e5b+5

is the derivative of f given by (2.8). Note that the endogenous part of the state next
period, s0, is determined by the asset demands chosen the period before.
2.3 Calibration
The parameters are calibrated as follows.
2.3.1 Endowments and Preferences
The risk aversion parameter  is set to 2. Agents work for 7 periods and live for 10.
Hence, each period represents 6 years. The quarterly subjective discount factor, , is
set at 0:99, as is standard in the macroeconomics literature.
2.3.2 Technology
Quarterly values for  and  are 0:95 and 0:01, respectively, as estimated in the
empirical literature (see, e.g., Hansen (1985) or Prescott (1986)). Capital share of
output, , equals 0:33. The quarterly value for  is 0:0026. The adjustment cost
parameter m is set to 10.
2.3.3 Borrowing Costs
The borrowing cost parameter b equals 200 in the atter case and 300 in the steeper
case. The steeper calibration produces a reasonable ratio of the marginal borrowing
cost to the risk-free rate at the equilibrium (see the Borrowing Costs subsection of
Section 4.1).
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2.3.4 Government
The government spending share, , equals 20 percent. Under the xed benet policy,
the benet equals 20 percent of the average wage. Under the proportional tax policy,
the tax equals 20 percent of the wage.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Fluctuations
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 Models Without Borrowing Costs: Capital, Output, Wages, and Returns
Figure 2.2: Capital, output, wage, and rate of return on capital in the base model,
and in models with stochastic depreciation or adjustment costs, with the xed benet
policy and without borrowing costs.
Before discussing the demand for bonds and the associated equity premium, it
is instructive to describe the uctuations against which the agents might want to
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insure. Figure 2.2 plots the evolution over 640 years of the capital stock, output, the
wage, and the rate of return on capital for three cases|the model with stochastic
depreciation, the model with adjustment costs, and the base model without either.
The xed benet policy is in place in each case.
Total factor productivity z across the 640 years has a mean of 0:999 (1:000) and a
standard deviation of 0:033 (0:032) in models without (with) stochastic depreciation.
This produces sizable uctuations in capital, output, the wage, and the annualized
rate of return, with standard deviations of 0:136, 0:203, 0:019, and 0:003 around the
means of 3:108, 5:356, 0:513, and 0:078 in the base model.4
Over the same time period, stochastic depreciation has a mean of 0:293 and a
standard deviation of 0:064. It has the eect of lowering the capital stock to 2:063
on average and increasing its standard deviation somewhat to 0:138. Output and the
wage decrease to 4:673 and 0:447 on average. The rate of return on capital is directly
hit by depreciation shocks, hence its standard deviation triples to 0:009 around the
mean of 0:064.
With adjustment costs, the rms \smooth" or \partially adjust" their investment
behavior over time. Hence, the standard deviation of capital, 0:048, is less than half
that in the base model around roughly the same mean (3:083). Consequently, output
and the wage uctuate less than in the base model: the standard deviation is 0:181
around the mean of 5:342 for the output, and 0:017 around the mean of 0:511 for the
wage. The rate of return on capital is even more volatile than in the base model|it
has a standard deviation of 0:010 around the mean of 0:078|since the marginal cost
of investment, q, uctuates substantially, exhibiting a standard deviation of 0:048
4The rst 50 observations are excluded from computations of statistics in this section so that
results are insensitive to initial conditions.
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around the mean of 1:001.
2.4.2 Bond Demands and the Equity Premium Without Borrowing Costs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−500
0
500
Base Model
Bond Shares (%)
bo
nd
 s
ha
re
s 
(%
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−200
−100
0
100
Stochastic Depreciation
Bond Shares (%)
bo
nd
 s
ha
re
s 
(%
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−20
0
20
40
Adjustment Costs
Bond Shares (%)
bo
nd
 s
ha
re
s 
(%
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.5
1
Base Model
Assets
a
ss
e
ts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.5
1
Stochastic Depreciation
Assets
a
ss
e
ts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.5
1
Adjustment Costs
Assets
a
ss
e
ts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−0.5
0
0.5
Base Model
Bond Demands
age
bo
nd
 d
em
an
ds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−0.1
0
0.1
Stochastic Depreciation
Bond Demands
age
bo
nd
 d
em
an
ds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−0.1
0
0.1
Adjustment Costs
Bond Demands
age
bo
nd
 d
em
an
ds
 Models Without Borrowing Costs: Average Bond Shares (%), Assets, and Bond Demands by Age
Figure 2.3: The average bond shares (%), assets, and bond demands by age in the
models with stochastic depreciation or adjustment costs, and in the base model, with
the xed benet policy and without borrowing costs.
Figure 2.3 plots age-specic average bond shares, assets, and bond demands for
the three models without borrowing costs. The bond share is the proportion of assets
invested in bonds, and the bond demand is the absolute amount demanded in bonds.
This gure shows that bonds are supplied by the young in the model with stochastic
depreciation, by the middle-aged in the model with adjustment costs, and by the old
in the base model.
This pattern is intuitive since the old live o their equity income, i.e., the assets
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they have accumulated (the principal) and the return earned on them. With stochas-
tic depreciation or adjustment costs, both the principal and the return on assets are
uncertain and, thus, can be lost. Thus, the old demand bonds.
On the other hand, the young live o both the wage income and, except for the
rst generation, the equity income. With stochastic depreciation, the wages and the
equity returns are uncorrelated, exhibiting a correlation coecient of  2:77 percent.
Hence, the income sources of the young are more diversied than those of the old.
Consequently, the young are in a position to insure the old by selling bonds to them
and going long capital. Indeed, this model exhibits a pattern of increasing bond
shares with age.
With adjustment costs, the income sources of the young are less diversied: the
wages and the returns exhibit a correlation coecient of 45:07 percent. This makes
the young less willing to supply bonds. In fact, the rst three generations demand
bonds, while the relatively wealthier middle-aged supply them.
In the base model, the age pattern of bond holdings is reversed, with the old
supplying the bonds that the young demand. As above, the main asset of the young|
their wages|is positively correlated with the rate of return on capital, exhibiting a
correlation coecient of 38:97. But without stochastic depreciation or adjustment
costs, the old face less risks: while the return on their assets is uncertain, the principal
cannot be lost and, thus, is safe. Consequently, the old are in a position to insure the
young against productivity shocks by selling bonds to them and going long capital.
The bond market provides eective insurance. For example, in the base model, it
covers about one-third of the young's potential loss in wages that might arise due to
an adverse shock.5
5To see this, note that the young short capital to insure against an adverse shock in z and the
resulting decline in wage. Consider two scenarios. In one, the beginning-of-period capital is equal to
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Figure 2.4 plots the demands for bonds of dierent age groups in specic states
of the world, as characterized by good or bad z's and 's. It shows that the bond
demands are responsive to dierent economic conditions. For example, the one-year-
olds supply more than twice as many bonds and the seven-year-olds demand three
times as many bonds in the state associated with favorable realizations of the shocks.
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Figure 2.4: The average bond demands by age starting from good and bad states
of the world as characterized by the z's and the 's in the model with stochastic
depreciation, the xed benet policy, and without borrowing costs.
The top panel of Table 2.1 shows that without borrowing costs, the annual equity
the average capital stock over 640 periods, 5:3600, and z is equal to the average z, 0:9999, implying
a wage of 0:6134 and a rate of return on capital of 0:3946 per period. In the other, capital is again
equal to its average value and z is one standard deviation below average, at 0:9668, implying a wage
of 0:5931 and a rate of return on capital of 0:3815. One measure of the young's potential loss in
wages is the dierence in wage between the two scenarios, 0:0203. Since the dierence in the rates of
return on capital between the two scenarios is 0:0131 and the average bond demand of the youngest
age group is 0:4801, the youngest gain 0:0063 in consumption units when the adverse shock hits.
Hence the potential capital gain covers about one-third of the loss.
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premium is very small. For example, in the model with stochastic depreciation, it is
a mere 0:021 percent. The return on capital averages 6:439 percent annually, which
is in line with the empirical estimate of 6:243. However, at 6:418 percent, the bond
returns are almost as high. The other two models exhibit similar patterns.
No Borrowing Costs
Equity Premium 0.021 0.024 0.005
Mean Stock Return 6.439 7.835 7.797
Mean Bond Return 6.418 7.811 7.793
Flatter Borrowing Costs
Equity Premium 3.579 3.332 3.309
Mean Stock Return 6.440 7.838 7.826
Mean Bond Return 2.860 4.506 4.517
Steeper Borrowing Costs
Equity Premium 5.615 5.205 5.179
Mean Stock Return 6.441 7.837 7.827
Mean Bond Return 0.827 2.632 2.647
Statistic (Annual, in 
Percent)
Stochastic 
Depreciation
Adjustment 
Costs
Base 
Model
Table 2.1: The equity premium and the average risky and safe returns in the models
with stochastic depreciation or adjustment costs, and in the base model, with the
xed benet policy, and with dierent specication of the borrowing costs.
2.4.3 Bond Demands and the Equity Premium With Borrowing Costs
Just as the demand for bonds is aected by dierent market conditions, it is also
aected by the introduction of borrowing costs. Figure 2.5 shows that borrowing
costs limit the supply of bonds, more so when they are steeper. The two bottom
panels of Table 2.1 show that this increases the bond price and reduces the safe
rate of return, regardless of the model. Figure 2.6 plots the returns and the equity
premium through time. It shows that the realized equity premium uctuates quite a
bit regardless of the presence of borrowing costs.
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Figure 2.6: The annual risky and safe returns and the realized equity premiums (in
percentage points) for the model with stochastic depreciation, the xed benet policy,
with or without borrowing costs.
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2.4.4 Leverage Considerations
Recall that the risky asset priced in this paper corresponds to the economy's entire
capital stock, rather than the stocks traded in the U.S. stock market. This choice is
motivated by the following leverage considerations. First, note that by changing the
leverage ratio, the equilibrium dierence between the average return on equity and
the average risk-free return, as well as the volatility of the risky asset, can be made
arbitrarily large. By the Modigliani-Miller theorem, this would not change anything
real in the economy (without borrowing costs). Now, the leverage ratio itself suers
from a labeling problem, as illustrated by the following example.
Suppose there is one company, General Motors (GM), two people (person A and
person B), and two states of the world (a good state and a bad state). Consider the
following two descriptions of the economy. Under the rst description, GM describes
itself as 50 percent equity nanced and 50 percent debt-nanced. I.e., it has some
capital it is using to produce, 50 percent of which it borrowed from person B, and
50 percent of which it raised from person A by issuing pieces of paper called equity.
GM earns some ~r = (rD + ~reE)=K, where capital (K) equals debt (D) plus equity
(E). It then pays out r to B and ~re to A. Suppose that total payouts (including
principal) are such that person A gets 500 dollars in the bad state and 4000 dollars
in the good state, while person B gets 1000 dollars in either state. Under the second
description, GM describes itself as 100 percent equity nanced. Here person A holds
all the shares, and is entitled to 1500 in the bad state and 5000 in the good state.
However, A directs the corporation to mail a check to B in the amount of 1000 dollars
on his behalf. Person A then takes the residual.
Note that the outcome for all agents (GM, A, B) is the same regardless of the
set of words used to describe the economy. However, in the second description where
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there is no debt whatsoever, GM is reporting a return to equity that is much safer
and with lower mean than under the rst description.6
2.4.5 Volatility
In the model, the volatility of returns on the risky asset is 0:5 percent without stochas-
tic depreciation or adjustment costs, and 1 percent with either of these features. This
is in line with the data because this paper models all capital in the entire economy,
rather than the stock market. The latter is just one sector of the former. To see this,
note that in the data, the rate of return on capital has an annual mean and volatility
of 6 percent and 0:5 percent, respectively. This volatility is very dierent from the
stock market volatility of 15 percent annually (the mean is about the same). Hence,
the Sharpe ratios for the stock return and the return on capital are dierent. Since
the Sharpe ratio is a leverage-insensitive measure, this conrms that the stock market
is just one sector of the economy.
2.4.6 Government Debt
Recall that the model features no government debt. This is done to conveniently iso-
late private bond transactions, which, unlike the government, are subject to borrowing
costs. But the model can be relabeled to produce any time path of exogenously spec-
ied debt values without aecting the equilibrium (see Kotliko (1986, 1988, 1993,
2003), Auerbach and Kotliko (1987), and Green and Kotliko (2008)).7
6On the other hand, the risk-free rate is the relative price of swapping consumption today for
sure consumption tomorrow, and hence does not suer from this labeling issue.
7To see this, recall that the model features the intergenerational redistribution policy which takes
resources from the workers and gives them to the elderly. Now, whatever amount, Xt, is taken from
the workers in period t can be relabeled as a borrowing of Xt (or any fraction of it, including a
fraction above 1) at time t by the government with repayment at time t+ 1 of Xt  (1 + rt) plus a
tax on the workers of Xt  (1 + rt) at time t + 1, where rt is the return on the bond purchased at
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Since with a dierent set of words the model can be described as featuring any
amount of government debt (and associated taxes and transfers), the level of gov-
ernment debt per se does not aect the equity premium. What impacts the equity
premium is the structure of the model, including borrowing costs as well as govern-
ment spending and generational policies.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
2.5.1 Alternative Policy
The previous results were obtained with the xed benet policy in place. This section
shows that an alterative policy|the proportional tax policy|does not aect the
equity premium results.
Figure 2.7 plots the average bond shares and bond demands by age in the model
with adjustment costs and without borrowing costs under each of the two policies.
It shows that the choice of the policy matters for bond holdings. For example, the
direction of bond positions of the young ips when the policy is changed|they are
long bonds under the xed benet policy and short bonds under the proportional tax
policy.
This pattern is intuitive since the two policies have dierent implications for the
time t.
If Xt (the amount said to be borrowed) exceeds the amount of taxes, Zt, being collected at time t
(with the no-debt labeling), the government would describe this as borrowing Xt at time t, making
a transfer payment of Xt Zt to the worker at time t, having the worker receive Xt plus interest at
t + 1, but having the worker pay in taxes, at t + 1, the amount Zt plus interest, plus Xt   Zt plus
interest. Note that with this as with any other relabeling, on balance and ignoring the labels, the
worker hands over Zt at time t to the government and gets back, on balance, zero at time t+ 1.
To have the elderly also holding bonds, the government would say that at time t the elderly are
buying Mt in bonds and receiving a transfer payment at time t of Mt. At time t + 1, they are
receiving Mt  (1 + rt) in principal plus interest, but also paying a tax of this same amount. So
the government takes nothing extra on net from the elderly at time t and at time t+ 1, but gets to
announce extra debt outstanding at time t of Mt.
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Figure 2.7: Average bond demands by age in the model with adjustment costs, xed
giving or proportional taking policy, and without borrowing costs.
No Borrowing Costs
Equity Premium 0.027 0.011 0.001
Mean Stock Return 8.197 9.306 9.220
Mean Bond Return 8.170 9.295 9.219
Flatter Borrowing Costs
Equity Premium 3.275 3.081 3.069
Mean Stock Return 8.207 9.308 9.306
Mean Bond Return 4.932 6.227 6.237
Steeper Borrowing Costs
Equity Premium 5.107 4.800 4.785
Mean Stock Return 8.207 9.308 9.306
Mean Bond Return 3.100 4.508 4.521
Statistic (Annual, in 
Percent)
Stochastic 
Depreciation
Adjustment 
Costs
Base 
Model
Table 2.2: Equity premium and average rate of return on capital and bond returns in
the models with stochastic depreciation or adjustment costs, and in the base model,
with proportional taking policy, with and without borrowing costs.
35
distribution of risk across generations. Under the xed benet policy, the workers
pay a higher proportion of their wages when times are bad, which increases their
demand for bonds. On the other hand, when taxes are proportional, the amount of
transfers is higher when times are good. This reduces the workers' risks and leads
them to supply more bonds. However, comparing Tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows that,
quantitatively speaking, the sensitivity of the equity premium to the policy choice is
negligible.
2.5.2 Borrowing Costs on a Subset of Generations
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Figure 2.8: Bond demands by age in the model with stochastic depreciation, xed
giving policy, and steeper borrowing costs imposed on a subset of age groups.
Recall that the previous results were obtained with borrowing costs imposed on
all generations. Figure 2.8 plots average bond demands by age for the model with
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stochastic depreciation where borrowing costs are imposed on dierent subsets of
generations. It shows that if the costs are imposed only on the young, the middle-
aged supply all the bonds that the old demand. And if the costs are imposed on
everyone but the oldest generation, that generation becomes the supplier. Of course,
the middle-aged, and especially the elderly, are not the natural suppliers of bonds
in this model. Hence, the gross supply of bonds is more limited when they are the
suppliers. However, it is not limited enough to signicantly lower the risk-free rate
and yield a sizable equity premium.
For example, in the model without borrowing costs, the gross supply of bonds is
0:201 on average. This value goes down to 0:164 if only the young face borrowing
costs, further down to 0:068 if both the young and the middle-aged face the costs, and
still further down to 0:0087 if everyone except the oldest faces the costs. The unlikely
suppliers get compensated by a somewhat lower risk-free rate (higher bond price).
However, at 0:038 percent, the equity premium remains two orders of magnitude too
small.
These ndings are in contrast with Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002),
where the equity premium emerges with borrowing constraints imposed only on the
young.
2.6 Accuracy of Solutions
A satisfactory solution requires the generation-specic Euler equations (4.13) hold
out of sample, i.e., on a set draws for the shocks not used to compute the equilibrium
decision rules. Hence, for each model considered, the accuracy of solutions is tested
on a fresh sequence of z's and 's that is 60 times longer than the 640-period sequence
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Page 1
Fixed Benefit Policy Proportional Tax Policy
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
No Borrowing Costs
Stochastic Depreciation 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.009
Adjustment Costs 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007
Base Model 0.001 0.004 0.023 0.001 0.010 0.042
Flatter Borrowing Costs
Stochastic Depreciation 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.010
Adjustment Costs 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.007
Base Model 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.023
Steeper Borrowing Costs
Stochastic Depreciation 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.010
Adjustment Costs 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.006
Base Model 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.023
0.004 0.008 0.010 0.004 0.008 0.010
0.004 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.009
0.004 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.007 0.011
More Volatile Depreciation 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.005 0.009 0.014
Borr. Costs on First 2 
Borr. Costs on First 5
Borr. Costs on First 8
Table 2.3: Minimum, mean, and maximum across generations of the average, across
time, of the absolute value of the generation-specic, out-of-sample deviations from
the perfect satisfaction of Euler equations.
used in the original simulation. This test entails simulating the model forward on the
new path of shocks, using the original asset demand functions, g, and clearing the
bond market in each period. The out-of-sample deviations from full satisfaction of
the Euler equations,
(s; z; ) = Ez
 
1 + r(s0; z0; 0) + g(s; z; )(r(s; z; )  r(s0; z0; 0)) (2.17)
  f(g(s; z; ))
u0(cg+1(s0; z0; 0))
u0(cg(s; z; ))
  1;
are computed for each period in the newly simulated time path and for each
generation g 2 1; : : : ; G  1.8 Finally, the average, across time, of the absolute value of
8The out-of-sample test does not apply to (4.14) since the inner loop is rerun, i.e. (4.14) will hold
by construction.
38
the deviations from Euler equations is computed for each generation. Table 3.1 reports
the summary statistics, across generations, of their average absolute deviations from
Euler equations for each model considered.
The largest deviation|4 percentage points|is observed in the base model without
borrowing costs and with proportional tax policy. Most other deviations are much
less than 1 percent.
2.7 Conclusion
Simulating a sizable equity premium in macroeconomic models has proved dicult,
hence the \equity premium puzzle". To explain the puzzle, economists had to apply
a lot of machinery. This paper shows that a sizable equity premium can easily be
obtained in a standard, multi-period OLG setting. This is demonstrated in a ten-
period, general equilibrium OLG model with aggregate uncertainty. The base model
is quite simple: it features isoelastic preferences with modest risk aversion, Cobb-
Douglas production technology, and realistic TFP shocks. On the scal side it includes
government consumption, as well as an intergenerational redistribution policy which
can be relabeled as government debt. The critical extra ingredient needed to produce
a sizable equity premium is the increasing cost of supplying bonds, i.e. of borrowing.
These costs are smooth but essentially zero when bond holdings are positive, and are
rising as bond holdings become negative. Such representation is consistent with the
empirical evidence of Scott (1996) and theoretical models of Milde and Riley (1988)
and Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007). A sizable equity premium
emerges immediately with the aforementioned features, but producing a pattern of
increasing bond demands by age requires extra elements, namely modest stochastic
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depreciation or capital adjustment costs. The ndings are robust to policy changes.
The model builds on Hasanhodzic and Kotliko (2013). As in that paper, it is
solved using Marcet (1988) and Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2009, 2011) to overcome
the curse of dimensionality.
The results dier from those of Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002),
who use a three-period, partial equilibrium OLG model with pure exchange. In
their model, hard borrowing constraints on the young suce to limit the supply of
bonds and yield a large equity premium. Here, only when all generations are subject
to borrowing costs is the supply of bonds limited enough for the equity premium
to emerge. This dierence between this paper's results and theirs highlights the
importance of more robust and realistic models in developing theories that match the
real world.
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Chapter 3
Generational Risk|Is It a Big Deal?
Simulating an 80-Period OLG Model With
Aggregate Shocks
3.1 Introduction
Economists have examined generational risk and its mitigation via government policy
in a number of theoretical models (e.g. Bohn (1998), Shiller (1999), Rangel and Zeck-
hauser (2001), Smetters (2003), Krueger and Kubler (2006), and Ball and Mankiw
(2007)). This literature presumes that generational risks are large and that the gov-
ernment is capable of sharing them.
This paper questions both propositions. It does so by calibrating and simulating
80-period, 40-period, and 20-period overlapping generations (OLG) life-cycle models
with aggregate productivity shocks. Solving such large-scale models without recourse
to local approximations or potentially inapplicable aggregations of state variables
has heretofore been impossible due to the well-known curse of dimensionality. But
a new computational method, developed by Ken Judd, Lilia Maliar, and Serguei
Maliar (2009, 2011), lifts this curse, taking us beyond the roughly 10- to 30-period
limit reached by Krueger and Kubler (2004, 2006) using their sparse grid projection
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method. We employ this method, and extend it to allow for the bond market.
In our models agents work full time prior to retirement. They do so in the context
of uncertainty about the economy's future productivity and, thus, uncertainty about
the compensation accruing to their supplies of labor and capital. Government enters
our model through a take-as-you-go policy in which workers are forced to hand over
resources each period to the elderly. We consider three such policies. In the rst,
the government takes a xed amount from workers each period independent of the
economy's state. In the second, the government's taking is proportional to workers'
earnings. The third is variable (progressive), with the amount taken far higher when
wages are higher. We calibrate the no-policy model using standard parameter val-
ues found in the real business cycle literature, including those governing aggregate
productivity shocks.
Our policies illustrate that intergenerational redistribution dominates business cy-
cle uctuations in determining the economy's long-run position. The variable policy is
intentionally unrealistic to illustrate that government actions can, in principle, desta-
bilize the economy and foster, not mitigate, generational risk. It can also dramatically
alter asset market demands by age.
There are three aspects of generational risk to consider. First, one can place
all generations into Rawl's (1971) original position (before anyone is born) and ask
whether, abstracting from trend growth, being born at date X is materially worse,
measured in terms of expected lifetime utility, than being born at date Y. Second,
one can study the degree of risk that any given generation faces over its lifetime. All
generations could have the same expected lifetime utilities but still be very unsure
what utility they will realize. Third, one can examine the scope for concomitant
generations to share their risk over their remaining lifetimes.
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Generational risk presupposes aggregate risk, i.e., risk that cannot be eliminated
via risk sharing across or within generations. But, as Lucas (1987) and Krusell and
Smith (1999) suggest, albeit in models with innitely-lived agents, such purely aggre-
gate or macro economic risk may be small. The presumed driver of macroeconomic
uctuations is shocks to productivity. But standard calibration of productivity shocks
implies a coecient of variation of the level of total factor productivity of only 0:0313.
And in our model, this limited productivity variation implies rather small coecients
of variations of the wage and the return to capital|0:0361 and 0:0326, respectively.
Yet it is these factor price shocks that dierent generations experience as macroeco-
nomic risk. Adding rare disasters to the productivity shock process as in Rietz (1988),
Barro (2006), and Weitzman (2007) raises these risk metrics, but not by much. The
new coecients of variation of productivity, the wage, and the return to capital are
0:058, 0:071, and 0:065, respectively. Alternatively, incorporating stochastic depreci-
ation, as in Ambler and Paquet (1994) and Furlanetto and Seneca (2011), also makes
little dierence. The three coecients are now 0:029, 0:043, and 0:060.
These fundamentals and the ability of cohorts to self insure by saving on their
own help explain our main nding of very limited generational risk. Moreover, the
fact that wage rates and returns to capital are being hit by the same shock, exhibiting
a correlation coecient in our baseline model of 0:515, means that substantial risk
sharing occurs automatically since risk sharing entails having agents experiencing,
directly or indirectly, the same shocks. Even in the model with stochastic depreciation
automatic risk sharing arises via the following general equilibrium eects. First, an X
percent depreciation-induced reduction in the stock of capital in period t is mitigated,
from the perspective of capital owners, by increases in the marginal productivity of
capital in period t + 1 and thereafter. Second, the reduction in capital stock hurts
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workers via a reduction in the marginal productivity of labor, i.e., in wages in period
t+ 1 and thereafter.
Our principal ndings number six. First, absent government policy, dierences in
expected lifetime utilities across generations, measured on a consumption-equivalent
basis, are less than 0:05 percent. Hence, Rawlsian justice prevails from an ex-ante,
original position and there is little risk associated with when one is born. This is to
be expected given the model's stationarity and our choice of initial conditions.
Second, there is limited scope for sharing generational risks among contempora-
neous generations on an ex-post basis, i.e., after the generations have been born. As
shown by Abel and Kotliko (1988), full risk sharing among contemporaneous agents
with homothetic preferences requires equal percentage changes in consumption from
one period to the next. Hence, one can measure the potential for generational risk
sharing by calculating the percentage adjustment in consumption of each agent at
each point in time needed to produce a uniform percentage change across all agents
alive at that point in time. In our base model, the largest such absolute adjustment
of any agent observed over more than 600 years is less that 1 percent. Moreover,
establishing full intergenerational risk sharing among all those alive between a given
period and the next entails a trivially small gain in expected utility except when
take-as-you-go policy is intentionally overly variable (progressive).
Third, letting agents share risk via a risk-free bond market does little to modify
these results. Moreover, since there is little risk to share, there is little demand
for these bonds relative to supply, which explains their low price. Low prices for safe
bonds means, of course, high safe rates of return and a small equity premium. Indeed,
in our model, the equity premium is trivially small, making the equity premium
puzzle even greater. The demanders of safe bonds are, as one would expect, the
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very young, who face the greatest risk to their consumption from the productivity
shock. The suppliers are the very old, who face the least consumption risk, since their
consumption depends not just on the risky return to their assets, but also on the safe
principal of their assets.
Applying variable taking policy ips the age pattern of net bond demands. This
policy transforms good (bad) times|when productivity is high (low)|into bad (good)
times for the young. Consequently, the best way for the young to hedge their risk
is to hold something that does well in good times, namely stocks. This nding that
the young hold bonds is opposite to that in Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992)
and other models in which the main asset of the young|their wages|is not strongly
correlated with the return to stocks. In those models, having wages is like already
holding bonds. In our model, having wages is like already holding stocks.
Fourth, generational risk arises in our model not from a failure of agents to pool
risk that strongly needs to be pooled, but from government policy itself. All three
take-as-you-go, intergenerational redistribution policies undermine Rawlsian justice,
producing signicantly dierent levels of lifetime expected utility of those born before
and after the policies are introduced. In addition, once cohorts are born, government
policy actually exacerbates generational risk, albeit not by much.
Fifth, government policy can dramatically alter the structure of bond demand
turning the young into net sellers rather than net buyers of bonds and doing the
opposite for the old.
Sixth, the ndings suggest that secular policy changes is where the real action is
when it comes to macroeconomics.
The paper next reviews the literature on generational risk sharing. Sections 4.2
and 4.3 describe the model and its calibration. Section 3.5 presents the solution
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algorithm. Section 4.4 presents results, and Section 3.7 conducts sensitivity analysis
of those results. Section 4.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The theoretical proposition that generational risk can and should be shared via scal
policy is well established. But the above-cited studies beg the question of how much
generational risk exists and how well government policies can share it. The main
impediment for answering this question has been the diculty of simulating realistic
life-cycle models with long-lived agents in economies subject to aggregate shocks.
Such models feature too many state variables. In our model, for example, there are
80 state variables reecting the shock itself and the distribution of wealth across the
80 age groups.
The reason the asset holdings of other agents matter for any given agent's behavior
is that agents dier in their preferences. A 70-year-old who will die at 100 is not
interested in consuming in any year after he is dead. But a contemporaneous 30-
year-old is interested in consuming during some of those years. These preference
dierences mean that who holds what will aect the economy's overall saving and
thus the course of future factor prices. And it is the course of future factor prices
that drives each agent's life-cycle choices.
Unfortunately, nding an exact solution to our 80-period model entails solving for
a xed point in age-specic choice functions, each of which has 80 arguments, and
doing so for all possible congurations of the state space. This is beyond the capacity
of any current computer and, arguably, any future computer.
Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2009, 2011), building on Marcet (1988), overcome this
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dimensionality curse by seeking internally consistent solutions for the choice functions
over the space of state variables that the economy will actually occupy. Their method
foregoes solving for the model's behavior in states that will never or essentially never
materialize given the ergodicity of the stochastic process driving the economy as well
as its initial conditions. The authors dub their solution the Generalized Stochastic
Simulation Algorithm or GSSA. GSSA is, perforce, an approximation method, but it
oers a signicant advance over other approximate approaches in overcoming the di-
mensionality curse. In particular, it does not use summary statistics of state variables
or require global behavior to emulate local behavior.
Ros-Rull (1994, 1996) uses local perturbation methods to solve large-scale (55-
period) OLG models subject to aggregate productivity shocks. These papers consider,
in part, whether the degree of completeness in risk-sharing arrangements materially
aects the economy and conclude it does not. The studies also nd extremely small
equity premia. Ros-Rull's ndings generally accord with those presented here al-
though we a) consider a continuum of shocks rather than a discrete set and b) do not
extrapolate from the economy's non-stochastic transition path.
Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) take a dierent approach. They point out that
agents care only about the evolution of factor prices and, by extension, tax policy.
They then approximate the true functions, which relate the evolution of factor prices
to the entire vector of state variables, with functions whose arguments are summary
statistics of the state variables, particularly the mean of the wealth distribution.
Their method does well within their context, namely a population of innitely
lived agents who dier with respect to their wealth and labor income. But, as the
authors point out, their method's success is connected to the similarity of consumption
behavior of agents, specically their uniform propensities to consume.
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Gourinchas (2000) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007) apply the Krusell
and Smith approach in OLG models. They nd it works well, but Krueger and
Kubler (2004) argue that Krusell and Smith's low-dimensional approximation ap-
proach cannot adequately handle more realistic OLG economies.1 As an alternative,
Krueger and Kubler approximate the equilibrium policy functions over the full state
space. To overcome the curse of dimensionality, they implement Smolyak's (1963) al-
gorithm, which guarantees uniform approximation over a small (sparse) set of points
in the multidimensional hypercube.2
Krueger and Kubler (2006) use their method to study unfunded social security in
a life-cycle model similar to ours, albeit with nine periods of life and four discrete pro-
ductivity shocks. They also incorporate stochastic depreciation, which is tailored to
produce signicant risk-sharing opportunities between workers and retirees|indeed,
large enough to permit a Pareto improvement a la Merton (1983). However, the large
negative correlation between wages and asset returns resulting from their depreciation
process is outside Davis and Willen's (2000) empirical estimates.
As an alternative to positing highly variable stochastic depreciation, we use gov-
ernment policy to produce risk sharing opportunities between age groups. Specically,
we consider a government taking policy that turns good (bad) times into bad (good)
times for the young, and good (bad) times into better (worse) times for the old. We
then show that a bond market can help pool the resulting generational risk.
1Our analysis also points to the inadequacy of the Krusell-Smith algorithm in our setting, in line
with Krueger and Kubler (2004).
2See also Malin, Krueger, and Kubler (2011) for general description of this method.
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3.3 The Model
Our model featuresG overlapping generations with shocks to total factor productivity.
Each agent works full time through retirement age R, dies at age G, and maximizes
expected lifetime utility. There are no borrowing or short asset sale constraints and
no adjustment costs, so rms maximize static prots. Finally, the government has
a take-as-you-go policy that takes either a xed or state-dependent amount from
workers each period and distributes the proceeds uniformly among retirees.
3.3.1 Endowments and Preferences
The economy is populated by G overlapping generations that live from age 1 to age
G. All agents within a generation are identical and are referenced by their age g and
time t. Each cohort of workers supplies 1 unit of labor each period. Hence, total labor
supply equals the retirement age R. Utility is time-separable and isoelastic, with risk
aversion coecient :
u(c) =
c1    1
1   : (3.1)
3.3.2 Technology
Production is Cobb-Douglas with output Yt given by
Yt = ztK

t L
1 
t ; (3.2)
where z is total factor productivity,  is capital's share of output, and Lt is labor
demand, which equals R, labor supply. Equilibrium factor prices are given by
wt = z(1  )
 PG
g=1 g;t 1
R
!
; (3.3)
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rt = z
 PG
g=1 g;t 1
R
! 1
: (3.4)
Total factor productivity, z, obeys
ln(zt+1) =  ln(zt) + t+1 + vt+1; (3.5)
where t+1  N (0; 2) and vt+1 is a rare disaster shock satisfying
vt+1 =
8>><>>:
ln(1  d); with probability p
0; otherwise:
(3.6)
This specication for vt+1 follows Barro (2006), although his model features a repre-
sentative agent and Lucas tree production, with no aggregate saving and investment.
3.3.3 Financial Markets
Households save and invest in either risky capital or one-period safe bonds. Investing
1 unit of consumption in bonds at time t yields 1 + rt units in period t+ 1. The safe
rate of return, rt, is indexed by t since it is known at time t although it is received at
time t+1. The total demand for assets of household age g at time t is denoted by g;t,
and its share of assets invested in bonds is denoted by g;t. Households enter period t
with g 1;t 1 in assets, which corresponds to the total assets they demanded the prior
period. Since investment decisions are made at the end of the period, the aggregate
supply of capital in period t, Kt, is the sum of assets brought by the households into
period t, i.e.
Kt =
GX
g=1
g;t 1: (3.7)
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Markets are incomplete; households cannot insure against productivity shocks or
against the date and state in which they will be born. Hence, the model potentially
permits considerable scope for generational risk sharing.
3.3.4 Government
We consider three alternative take-as-you-go policies, which we call variable, xed,
and proportional. Under the variable policy, the percentage of the wage taken by the
government from each worker is linear in the wage. Under the xed policy, taking is
xed and independent of the wage. Under the proportional policy, the government
takes a xed percentage of the wage from each worker. Total takings are distributed
uniformly among retirees. Let Hg;t denote the government taking from the age g
household at time t, and Bg;t government giving to the age-g household at time t.
Then
Hg;t =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
H; with xed policy
(wt)wt`g; with variable policy
wt`g; with proportional policy
0; otherwise;
(3.8)
where
(wt) = a

w +
b w   a

w
w  

w
(wt  

w); (3.9)
where

w and w are the estimates of the minimum and maximum values of w. Param-
eters a, b,  ,

w, and w are described in Section 4.3. Finally,
Bg;t =
8>><>>:
(1  `g)
PG
g=1Hg;t
L
; with government
0; otherwise:
(3.10)
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Implicit in the above formulation is each period's takings equal that period's givings:
GX
g=1
Hg;t =
GX
g=1
Bg;t: (3.11)
As shown in Green and Kotliko (2008), this policy can be labeled to produce what-
ever time path of explicit and implicit debts the government wishes to report.
3.3.5 Household Problem
Households of age g in state (s; z) maximize expected remaining lifetime utility given
by
Vg(s; z) = maxc;; fu(c) + E [Vg+1(s0; z0)]g (3.12)
subject to
c1;t = `1wt   1;t  H1;t +B1;t; (3.13)
cg;t = `gwt + [g 1;t 1(1 + rt 1) + (1  g 1;t 1)(1 + rt)] g 1;t 1   g;t  Hg;t +Bg;t;
(3.14)
for 1 < g < G; and
cG;t = `Gwt + [G 1;t 1(1 + rt 1) + (1  G 1;t 1)(1 + rt)] G 1;t 1  HG;t +BG;t;
(3.15)
where cg;t is the consumption of a g-year old at time t and (4.9){(4.11) are budget
constraints for age group 1, those between 1 and G, and that for age group G.
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3.3.6 Equilibrium
At time t, the economy's state is (st; zt), with st = (1;t 1; : : : ; G 1;t 1) denoting
the set of age-specic asset holdings. Given the initial state of the economy s0 =
(1; 1; : : : ; G 1; 1; z0), the recursive competitive equilibrium is dened as follows:
Denition. The recursive competitive equilibrium is governed by the collection of
the value functions and the household policy functions for total savings g(s; z), the
share of savings invested in bonds g(s; z), and consumption cg(s; z) for each age
group g, the choices for the representative rm K(s; z) and L(s; z), the government
policy H(s; z) and B(s; z), as well as the pricing functions r(s; z), w(s; z), and r(s; z)
such that:
1. Given the pricing functions, the value functions (4.8) solve the recursive problem
of the households subject to the budget constraints (4.9){(4.11), and g, g, and
cg are the associated policy functions for all g and for all dates and states.
2. Wages and rates of return on capital satisfy (4.3) and (4.4), i.e. the rm maxi-
mizes prots at each point in time for given w and r.
3. The government budget constraint (3.11) is satised.
4. All markets clear: Labor and capital market clearing conditions are implied by
Lt = R and (4.7). Since bonds are in zero net supply, bond market clearing
requires
GX
g=1
g(s)g(s) = 0: (3.16)
Market clearing conditions in labor, capital, and bond markets and satisfaction
of household budgets imply market clearing in consumption.
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Finally, for all age groups g = 1; : : : ; G   1, optimal intertemporal consumption
and investment choice satises
1 = Ez

(1 + r(s0; z0))
u0(cg+1(s0; z0))
u0(cg(s; z))

and (3.17)
0 = Ez [u
0(cg+1(s0; z0))(r(s; z)  r(s0; z0))] ; (3.18)
where Ez is the conditional expectation of z
0 given z. Note that the endogenous part
of the state next period, s0, is determined by the asset demands chosen the period
before. Hence, the only stochastic element of the next period's state vector is the
aggregate productivity level, z0.
3.4 Calibration
We rst investigate generational risk and its potential for mitigation in the 80-period,
no-bond economy. We then turn to 40- and 20-period models with bonds to examine
how a bond market aects generational risk and to assess the size of equity premia.
Including a bond market entails approximating G additional functions (G   1 bond
shares plus the annual safe rate of return, all of which are functions of the state
variables). This makes converging to a xed point in the function space harder to
achieve.
The rest of the parameters are calibrated as follows.
3.4.1 Endowments and Preferences
We consider values for  2 f2; 5; 15g. In our 80-period model agents work for 45
periods and live for 80. In the 40-period model, each period represents 1:5 years
(ages 20 through 80), with retirement after 30 periods. In the 20-period model, each
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period represents 3 years (ages 20 through 80), with retirement after 15 periods.
We set the quarterly subjective discount factor, , at 0:99, as is standard in the
macroeconomics literature. This implies values of  of 0:96, 0:94, and 0:89 in the 80-,
40-, and 20-period models, respectively.
3.4.2 Technology
Quarterly values for  and  are 0:95 and 0:01, respectively. This corresponds to
values of 0:8145, 0:7351, 0:5404 for , and 0:0186, 0:0217, 0:0269 for , in the 80-, 40-,
and 20-period models, respectively. The probability of rare disaster, p, is 3 percent
per year in the 80-period model and 1:7 percent per year in the 40- and 20-period
models. The fraction d by which productivity contracts when a disaster hits is 0:2
in the 80- and 40-period models and 0:15 in the 20-period model. Capital share of
output, , equals 0:33.
3.4.3 Government
The variable policy parameters a and b equal 0:1 and 0:4, respectively. The values
for

w and w are estimated as the minimum and maximum wage from a previous
run of the same model (to start, we use the minimum and maximum wage from the
no-policy model). This yields

w and w of 1:572 and 1:976 in the 80-period model,
and 0:674 and 0:872 in the 20-period model.3 The resulting taking rates range from
5 percent to 40 percent of the wage in the 80-period model, and from 9 percent to
40 percent of the wage in the 20-period model. Note that (3.8) and (3.9), together
with the above choice of parameters, imply that the variable policy is countercyclical,
i.e., the correlation between net wage and z is negative. The reason for this negative
3Government policies are not considered in the 40-period model.
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correlation is that as the wage rises, the taking rate is applied to all wages, not just
the increment of wages.
The xed policy taking, H, is set as the sample mean of the variable taking
(wt)wt from the corresponding variable policy model simulation. This equals 0:333,
or 20 percent of the average wage, in the 80-period model. Similarly, the proportional
taking rate  equals 20 percent of the wage, which is the average taking rate from
the variable policy model.
3.5 Algorithm
Our algorithm consists of an inner loop and an outer loop. In the outer loop we
solve for the asset demand functions of each age group by applying Judd, Maliar,
and Maliar's (2009, 2011) generalized stochastic simulation algorithm (GSSA) to our
OLG setting. We start by making an initial guess of generation-specic asset demand
functions g (which amounts to guesses of the consumption functions) as polynomials
in the state variables. Next we take a draw of the path of z's for T periods and run the
model forward over those periods using the guessed asset demand functions to com-
pute the state variables in each period. Next, for each age group, g, we evaluate the
Euler condition to determine what age group g's asset demand (or, equivalently, con-
sumption) should be in each period t. This evaluation is based on the derived period
t state variables and the current guessed asset demand (equivalently, consumption)
function of the agent age g+1. We then regress these time series of generation-specic
asset demands on the state variables and use the regression estimates to update the
corresponding polynomial coecients. We iterate the updating of these functions
based, always, on the same draw of the path of z's until asset demand functions
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converge.
The inner loop is our extension of GSSA that allows us to solve for bond shares
of each age group and the risk-free rates of return. Here we use binary search to
determine the risk-free rate r that satises (4.12). In this binary search, the evaluation
of the net bond demand is achieved by using another binary search to determine the
unique bond shares that satisfy the rst order conditions (4.14).
The following is the step by step description of our algorithm.
Initialization:
 Set z = 1 and solve for the nonstochastic steady state asset demands of each
age group without bond, s = (s1; : : : ; sG 1). Let (s0; z0) = (s; z) be the starting
point of the simulation.
 ApproximateG 1 asset demand functions by polynomials in the state variables:
1(s; z) = 1(s; z; b1); : : : ; G 1(s; z) = G 1(s; z; bG 1), where b1; : : : bG 1 are
polynomial coecients. We use degree 1 polynomials.4 To start iterations, we
use the following initial guess for the coecients: b1 = (0; 0:9; 0; : : : ; 0; 0:1s1); : : : ; bG 1 =
(0; 0; : : : ; 0; 0:9; 0:1sG 1). Note that for all g 2 f1; : : : ; G   1g, the initial bg is
such that sg = g(s; z; bg).
Outer loop:
 Take draws of the path of z's for T years. We set T to 640.
 Simulate the model forward for t = 0; : : : ; T . More precisely, at time t, for each
age group g, calculate its asset demand 
(p)
g given the current guess for the coe-
4Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2009, 2011) recommend orthogonal polynomials, but we found no
dierence in results from using higher order terms.
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cients b
(p)
g , where the subscript (p) denotes the current iteration of the outer loop.
I.e., 
(p)
g;t equals the inner product of the vector (1; st; zt) with the vector of coef-
cients b
(p)
g , where st = (
(p)
1 (st 1; zt 1); : : : ; 
(p)
G 1(st 1; zt 1)). Then the state at
time t+1 and iteration p is given by (st+1; zt+1) = (
(p)
1 (st; zt); : : : ; 
(p)
G 1(st; zt); zt+1),
where zt+1 given zt is determined by (4.6).
 Inner loop:
{ Use binary search to solve (4.12) for rt, for all t = 0; : : : ; T . To start, make
an (arbitrary) initial guess for the value of rt.
{ For all t = 0; : : : ; T , given rt, for all g = 1; : : : ; G   1, solve (4.14) for
g 1;t using another binary search (evaluate the expectation in (4.14) using
Gaussian quadrature).
{ Use g 1;t found above for all g and for all t to calculate (4.12) and update
rt for all t.
 Note that for each age group g and each state (st; zt), t = 1; : : : ; T , (4.13) implies
g(st; zt) = Ez

g(st; zt)(1 + r(st+1; zt+1))
u0(cg+1(st+1; zt+1))
u0(cg(st; zt))

(3.19)
for equilibrium asset demands g. Denote the right-hand-side of (3.19) by
yg(st; zt) and evaluate the expectation using Gaussian quadrature.
 For each age group g, regress yg(st; zt) on (st; zt) and a constant term using
regularized least squares with Trikhonov regularization (see Judd, Maliar, and
Maliar, 2011 for details). Denote the estimated regression coecients by b^
(p)
g .
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 Check for convergence: If
1
G  1
G 1X
g=1
1
T
TX
t=1
(p 1)g (st; zt)  (p)g (st; zt)(p 1)g (st; zt)
 < ;
end. Otherwise, for each age group g update the coecients as b
(p+1)
g = (1  
)b
(p)
g +b^
(p)
g and return to the beginning of the outer loop. We use  2 [0:01; 0:2]
and  2 [10 10; 10 13].
3.5.1 Out-of-Sample Deviations from the Perfect Satisfaction of Euler
Equations
Note that in our 640-period sample the generation-specic Euler equations (4.14)
hold almost perfectly by construction. A satisfactory solution requires they hold out
of sample as well. Hence, to test the accuracy of solutions, for each model considered
we draw a fresh sequence of z's that is 10 times longer than the 640-period sequence
used in the original simulation. We then simulate the model forward on the new
path of z's, using the original asset demand functions, g, and, in the case of bonds,
clearing the bond market by rerunning the inner loop. We calculate the out-of-sample
percentage deviations from full satisfaction of the Euler equations,
(s; z) =

Ez [(1 + r(s
0; z0))u0(cg+1(s0; z0))]  u0(cg(s; z))
u0(cg(s; z))

 100; (3.20)
for each period in the newly simulated time path and for each generation g 2
1; : : : ; G  1.5 Finally, we compute the average, across time, of the absolute value
of the deviations from Euler equations for each generation. Table 3.1 reports the
5The out-of-sample test does not apply to (4.14) since the inner loop is rerun, i.e. (4.14) will hold
by construction.
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Deviations from Euler Equations
Model
Policy Bond Technology Depreciation Min Mean Max
80-Period Models
2 None No AR(1) No 0.00006 0.00019 0.00074
2 Fixed No AR(1) No 0.00013 0.00039 0.00210
2 Variable No AR(1) No 0.00008 0.00037 0.00085
2 Proportional No AR(1) No 0.00014 0.00026 0.00099
5 None No AR(1) No 0.00014 0.00056 0.00233
2 None No Rare Disasters No 0.00025 0.00081 0.00309
40-Period Models
2 None No AR(1) No 0.00010 0.00037 0.00058
2 None Yes AR(1) No 0.00024 0.00037 0.00059
2 None No Rare Disasters No 0.00035 0.00119 0.00185
2 None Yes Rare Disasters No 0.00087 0.00309 0.00648
20-Period Models
2 None No AR(1) No 0.00017 0.00066 0.00088
2 None Yes AR(1) No 0.00043 0.00049 0.00070
2 Variable No AR(1) No 0.00012 0.00047 0.00158
2 Variable Yes AR(1) No 0.00111 0.00462 0.00761
15 None No AR(1) No 0.00576 0.02147 0.04999
15 None Yes AR(1) No 0.00989 0.01377 0.02865
6 None No Rare Disasters No 0.00748 0.01982 0.03055
6 None Yes Rare Disasters No 0.00548 0.00641 0.01002
2 None No Random Walk No 0.00250 0.01367 0.02357
2 None No AR(1) Stochastic 0.00234 0.01351 0.02799
Mean Absolute Euler Eq. Deviations
γ
Table 3.1: Minimum, mean, and maximum across generations of the average, across
time, of the absolute value of the generation-specic, out-of-sample deviations from
the perfect satisfaction of Euler equations.
60
summary statistics, across generations, of their average absolute deviations from Eu-
ler equations for each model considered.6
Deviations tend to be larger in cases with high risk aversion, rare disaster, or
bonds. The worst preforming model is the 20-period model with very high risk aver-
sion ( = 15) and no bonds, where the cross-generation mean and maximum of the
generation-specic time-averages of absolute Euler equation deviations are 2 percent
and 5 percent, respectively. In most other models, deviations are at least an order of
magnitude smaller.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 80-Period Models Without Bonds
3.6.1.1 Rates of Return and Wages
Figure 3.1 presents the evolution over 640 years of the capital stock, output, the rate
of return, and the wage. These results are from our main model, which features 80
periods, no bonds, a risk aversion coecient  equal to 2, and no rare disasters. Each
panel displays results for three cases|no policy, xed policy, and variable policy.
Total factor productivity across the 640 years has a mean of 0:9987 and a standard
deviation of 0:0313. This produces sizeable uctuations in capital, output, the rate
of return, and the wage, with standard deviations of 36:67, 4:67, 0:0013, and 0:070
around means of 1345, 129, 0:038, and 1:93.
Figure 3.1's main message is the secular impact of generational policy.7 Where the
6Note, these deviations are not Euler errors which capture dierences in period t's marginal
utility and period (t+ 1)'s realized marginal utility (properly weighted by  and r(s0; z0)). Rather,
they reference the discrepancy in period t between the marginal utility and its properly weighted
expectation.
7Proportional policy, which strikes middle ground between xed and variable policies, is not
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Figure 3.1: Capital, output, rate of return on capital, and wage rates in the 80-period
model with and without policies.
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economy nds itself in the future is primarily the function of what the government
does to it. Here the policies are taking from the young, who are saving for their
retirement, and giving to the old, who are spending in light of their approaching
deaths. This redistribution from savers to spenders produces a sizable crowding out
of the national saving. Given the closure of the economy, domestic investment falls
pari passus. With xed (variable) policy, the average capital stock falls by 34:12
(33:30) percent, producing a 12:92 (12:53) percent long-term decline in both average
output and average wage and a 32:64 (31:31) percent increase in the average rate of
return.
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Figure 3.2: Average lifetime rates of return on capital and wage rates of newborns
born in specied year in the 80-period model with and without policies.
Despite the annual variability in both z and K, Figure 3.2 reveals little variability
in average lifetime rates of return on capital and wage rates of newborns. For the rates
of return on capital in the no policy, xed policy, and variable policy simulations, the
plotted in this and subsequent gures to avoid clutter, but its eect on generational risk is analyzed
in Sections 3.6.1.4 and 3.7.3.
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standard deviation is 0:00038, 0:00092, and 0:00043, around means of 0:039, 0:052,
and 0:051. For the wage rates, the standard deviation is 0:03, 0:03, and 0:016 around
means of 1:92, 1:67, and 1:68 for the three models respectively. This suggests that
the lifetime risks newborns face may not vary as much as macroeconomic uctuations
might lead us to believe. Moreover, given the longevity of households, there may be
signicant scope for self-insurance by pooling risks over time.
3.6.1.2 Consumption and Asset Demands
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Figure 3.3: Consumption of workers and retirees through time in the 80-period model
with and without policies.
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Figure 3.3 plots annual consumption levels through time of the 45 working age
groups (in blue) and those of the 35 retired age groups (in green) without and with
xed and variable policies. In each year there are 45 blue points being plotted,
reecting the consumption of the 45 workers (from youngest to oldest) in that year,
and 35 green points, reecting the consumption of retirees (from youngest to oldest).
With no policy, workers consume somewhat more than retirees, and the variability
of consumption is similar for the two groups. Note that there is little dierence across
time in the general level of consumption of either workers or retirees or in the spread
of consumption among workers or among retirees.
As the next two panels illustrate, once policy is introduced, workers, on average,
consume less than retirees as they change their desired longitudinal age-consumption
prole in light of the higher rate of return on capital. Moreover, there is more vari-
ability in consumption levels among both workers and retirees at a point in time
and, in the case of variable policy, across time for retirees. These charts suggest that
government policy can exacerbate generational risk.
Figure 3.4 shows the downside of the intergenerational redistribution. It charts
average lifetime consumption of successive new generations, referenced as newborns.
This average is both lower and more volatile with policy than without. The lower
average is not surprising as each new generation can expect to a) pay more when
young than it receives when old in a present value sense and b) experiences lower
real wages over its lifetime thanks to capitals crowding out. Of particular interest is
the volatility of lifetime consumption when the generational policies, especially the
variable policy, are introduced. Again we see the take-as-you-go policies exacerbating,
not mitigating age group dierences in realized lifetime consumption.
The gure also considers high and low risk aversion as well as occasional rare
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Figure 3.4: Average lifetime consumption and variability of lifetime consumption
(standard deviation of an age group's consumption over its lifetime) of newborns
through time in the 80-period model with and without policies. In models labeled
\no policy", \variable policy", and \xed policy" the risk aversion is 2 and there are
no rare disasters; in the model labeled \high gamma" the risk aversion is 5 and there
are no rare disasters; in the model labeled \rare disaster", the risk aversion in 2, the
probability of disaster in 3 percent per year, and contraction size during the disaster
is 20 percent.
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disasters. In the long run, increasing the risk aversion increases the average and
lowers the volatility of lifetime consumption as it leads to more capital accumulation
and higher wages. In the rare disaster case the opposite is true as some of the
economy's production potential is periodically wiped out.
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Figure 3.5: Asset distribution by age for years of minimum and maximum age 85
assets, and average assets by age in the 80-period model with and without policies.
Figure 3.5 plots the age-asset distribution for the two years when the 85-year-olds
have the smallest and largest amounts of assets. We see the typical life-cycle pattern
of asset accumulation in working years and decumulation in retirement. The change
in the shape of the age-asset prole with the take-as-you-go policies is as expected,
with less private wealth accumulation when young and slower decumulation when old
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thanks to the infusion of government receipts. Although comparison of Figure 3.5's
upper-right and lower-left panels suggests that the shape of the asset distribution is
systematically very dierent in the case of variable versus xed policy, this is not the
case. The lower-right panel shows that, on average, the age-asset proles are virtually
indistinguishable under the two policies.
3.6.1.3 Utility Measures of Generational Risk
In Figure 3.6 and the associated Table 3.2 we consider more formal measures of
generational risk, which we call expected and realized lifetime utility measures.
Each newborn's expected lifetime utility measure is dened as the compensating
consumption dierential needed to achieve the average (expected) lifetime utility
across newborns. To compute the dierential for, say, the age group born in year
x, we rst calculate the average realized lifetime utility of generation x across 5; 000
dierent paths of draws of the productivity shock. Call this EUx. Next, we divide
the average of EUt over all t from time 0 to 640 by EUx and raise the ratio to the
power 1=(1   ). The result is the factor by which consumption of generation x
needs to be multiplied in all possible states it might experience to achieve the same
lifetime utility, on average, as other generations enjoy. The closer are the consumption
dierentials to 1, and the less variable they are through time, the less dierence does
the date of birth make for the household's expected lifetime utility, i.e. the smaller is
the generational risk. Given the stationary nature of the model, the expected lifetime
utility dierentials should be very small except for generations born while the policies
are being introduced and the economy is heading toward its new stochastic steady
state (ergodic distribution).
The realized utility measure is based on the particular state the generation is
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Figure 3.6: Expected and realized utility measures of generational risk in the 80-
period benchmark model with and without policy, and two of its variants. In models
labeled \no policy", \variable policy", and \xed policy" the risk aversion is 2 and
there are no rare disasters; in the model labeled \high gamma" the risk aversion is 5
and there are no rare disasters; in the model labeled \rare disaster", the risk aversion
in 2, the probability of disaster in 3 percent per year, and contraction size during the
disaster is 20 percent. The realized (expected) measure of generational risk is dened
as the variability of the compensating consumption dierential of newborns through
time needed to achieve the average realized (expected) utility of newborns.
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born into and the particular sequence of productivity shocks drawn over its lifetime.
We rst calculate each generation's particular realized lifetime utility and form the
average of these realized values across all generations born between years 0 and 640.
Next, we calculate for each generation the factor by which we need to multiply each
year's realized consumption to produce the same realized lifetime utility as the rst
640 generations experience on average.
Coefficients of Variation (in Percent) of Expected and Realized Generational Risk Measures
Model
no policy 0.03 1.76 0.03 1.83
variable policy 0.64 1.26 0.02 1.08
fixed policy 1.34 2.70 0.06 2.58
high gamma 0.02 1.77 0.02 1.85
rare disaster 0.20 4.59 0.08 4.82
Expected utility 
measure CV (%) 
full sample
Realized utility 
measure CV (%) 
full sample
Expected utility 
measure CV (%) 
drop 1st 75 periods
Realized utility 
measure CV (%) 
drop 1st 75 periods
Table 3.2: Coecients of variation of the expected and realized utility measures of
generational risk in the 80-period models presented in Figure 3.6.
The left-hand-side panels of Figure 3.6 plot these two measures for our main model
without and with government policies. The right-hand side panels consider high risk
aversion and rare disaster versions of the model. Table 3.2 shows the corresponding
coecients of variation, in percentage points, computed using both the entire data
samples plotted in Figure 3.6, and the subsamples obtained by removing the rst 75
observations from each time-series.
For all models and both generational risk measures, realized lifetime consumption
dierentials are close to 1 and vary very little though time. Generational risk is, as
expected, smaller (the consumption dierentials are closer to 1) under the expected
utility measure than under the realized utility measure.
The rst two columns of Table 3.2, where all 640 years are considered, suggest
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that the government policies exacerbate generational risk. But some of this risk arises
from being born either during or after the policies are fully infused in the economy's
general equilibrium. The last two columns leave out the rst 75 years, but they still
show the policies worsening generational risk. Even so, there is not much generational
risk to either be shared or worsened. Nor does high risk aversion or rare disasters
change this story much.
3.6.1.4 Consumption Co-movement Measures of Generational Risk
Correlation Measures of Generational Risk in 80-Period Models
No Policy Rare Disaster
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
0.973 0.998 1.000 0.983 0.999 1.000 0.917 0.994 1.000
0.865 0.986 1.000 0.840 0.986 1.000 0.641 0.955 1.000
0.785 0.963 1.000 0.840 0.987 1.000 0.637 0.934 1.000
0.822 0.975 0.997 0.863 0.991 0.996 0.682 0.958 0.993
all agents: absolute % adjustment 0.000 0.191 0.855 0.000 0.163 0.814 0.000 0.250 2.903
Fixed Policy Variable Policy Proportional Policy
0.886 0.993 1.000 -0.986 0.465 1.000 0.984 0.999 1.000
0.618 0.957 1.000 0.995 0.999 1.000 0.953 0.994 1.000
0.330 0.874 1.000 -0.989 0.008 1.000 0.953 0.993 1.000
0.394 0.904 0.995 -0.988 0.065 0.985 0.967 0.989 0.992
all agents: absolute % adjustment 0.000 0.513 1.815 0.000 1.015 9.684 0.000 0.496 1.279
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Table 3.3: Measures of generational risk in the 80-period models: summary statistics
of pairwise correlations in percentage changes in consumption among dierent age
groups, and absolute percentage adjustments needed to achieve full risk sharing. The
rst 75 observations (i.e. the capital stock transition period after the policies are
introduced) have been dropped from all calculations.
Abel and Kotliko (1988) show that full risk sharing among contemporaneous gen-
erations, indeed all agents, with the homothetic preferences considered here requires
equal percentage changes in the consumption from one period to the next. Hence,
one can measure the extent of generational risk by considering the co-movement of
consumption across age groups as well as the extent of consumption adjustments that
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would be needed to achieve perfect consumption co-movement.
Table 3.3 considers such measures.8 First, it reports summary statistics of pair-
wise correlations in annual percentage changes in consumption between dierent age
groups among workers only, retirees only, and all agents.9 Second, it examines the
correlation of each agent's annual percentage change in consumption with the annual
percentage change in per capita consumption. Third, it summarizes the agent- and
year-specic absolute percentage consumption adjustment needed to achieve perfect
risk sharing, i.e. to ensure that all agents experience the same percentage change in
the year in question.
The rst four rows of the no policy, rare disaster, and high  panels of Table 3.3
show that the average correlations considered in the rst and second consumption
co-movement measures exceed 0:934. Indeed, the smallest correlation coecient of
any agent's consumption with per capita consumption in these three panels is 0:682.
The corresponding values in the xed policy panel are slightly lower|at least 0:874
for the average consumption co-movement measures, and exceeding 0:394 for the co-
movement with per capita consumption measure|while in the proportional policy
panel the corresponding values are slightly higher|0:993 and 0:967. The fth row of
these ve panels shows that the average (across agents) absolute percentage adjust-
ments needed to achieve full risk sharing are less than 1 percent in all cases, ranging
from a low of 0:163 in the high  case to a high of 0:513 percent in the xed policy
case. Hence, generational risk in the absence of generational policy is tiny according
to all three measures.
8Values of 0:000 and 1:000 reect rounding.
9For each age group g, we compute that age group's percentage change in consumption between t
and t 1, (cg;t cg 1;t 1)=cg 1;t 1, for all t. We then correlate the percentage change in consumption
time series for any pair of age groups.
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The variable policy panel of Table 3.3 paints a dierent picture. It shows that
pairwise correlations in percentage changes in consumption among some workers are
highly negative. This is not surprising since variable policy is modeled intentionally
to be countercyclical, i.e. to turn good times for workers into bad times as the increase
(decrease) in taking exceeds the increase (decrease) in the gross wage.
The youngest workers are hurt the most for two reasons. First, the current high
taking implies likely high takings in the near future due to persistence in total factor
productivity (z). Second, they still have a long time to wait before they can benet
from high giving and increased asset income in retirement. On the other hand, for the
oldest workers high taking in good times is oset by both the expectation of future
high giving and higher asset returns (due to the persistence in the z's). Hence, one
would expect the correlation in percentage changes in consumption to be the lowest
between the youngest and the oldest of workers. Indeed, the minimum correlation of
 0:986 occurs between the youngest (1-year-old) and the oldest (45-year-old) workers.
Moreover, the larger is the distance in the workers' age, the lower is the correlation
in their percentage changes in consumption.10
3.6.1.5 Examining the Krusell-Smith Approximation
We next conduct an experiment to examine Krusell and Smith's (1998) contention
that a summary statistic of the wealth distribution, particularly average asset hold-
ings, is a sucient descriptor of the full state space. The experiment relies on our
derived age-specic consumption functions whose arguments, recall, are the individ-
ual asset holdings of all 80 generations as well as the current productivity shock.
10This trend can be seen easily as follows. Find, for each worker i, that worker, j, whose percentage
change in consumption is least correlated with that of i. Then relate those correlations to the distance
in age between i and j.
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Specically, we ask whether reshuing the assets holdings between the young and
the old signicantly alters individual and aggregate consumption holding xed the
asset holdings of the age group itself. The reshuing for an agent age g entails start-
ing with the assets of the oldest group that's not age g and exchanging the asset with
those of the youngest agent that's not age g and proceeding in this fashion to the
assets of the next oldest and next youngest agents not age g. If evaluating each age
group's consumption with this reshuing of the values of the arguments of the func-
tion (apart from the value of the age group's own assets) produces major dierences
in predicted consumption, then who holds the assets, not just their average value,
matters.
Figure 3.7 shows the average (across 640 years) dierence between the recomputed
and the original consumption as a percentage of the original consumption for each of
our 80-period models under consideration. The top-left panel does this for aggregate
consumption and the rest of the panels for age-group-specic consumption.
Consider rst aggregate consumption. The reshuing of assets makes little dier-
ence in our base case, no-policy model. But with variable policy, there is a roughly
6 percent increase in average annual consumption, which is major. Even the roughly
2 percent increase in average annual consumption with xed policy and no policy,
but rare disasters is sizeable when one considers how such a consumption dieren-
tial would aect the economy's capital formation through time. Moreover, reshued
values of average annual aggregate consumption obscure large variations across the
years. Across all 640 years, the maximum increase in aggregate consumption from
reshuing is 9:923 percent, while the minimum is 0:263 percent. This suggests that
the Krusell-Smith algorithm is inadequate in our life-cycle setting.
Why does aggregate consumption rise with the reshuing? As the three no-policy
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Figure 3.7: Examining the Krusell-Smith approximation: average percentage changes
in age-group-specic and aggregate consumption in the 80-period models after reshuf-
ing of asset distributions.
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panels show, consumption of the young increases and that of the old declines. This is
not surprising since the reshuing scheme puts more assets in the hands of the young.
This ensures that the assets will be around longer in the economy, and that wage rates
will be higher and rates of return lower for many years to come. For workers, the
reshuing raises their lifetime resources as perceived by their consumption functions
leading to an unambiguous rise in their consumption. For retirees, the reshuing
leaves their own assets unchanged, but lowers their perceived future rates of return.
But their consumption is driven primarily by their own holdings of assets, not by the
return on their assets. Hence, it's not surprising that the collective consumption of
retirees falls by less than the collective consumption of the young and that aggregate
consumption rises.
Note also that, other things equal, the impact of reshuing on aggregate con-
sumption is greater in the models with policies. The reason is clear. The capital
stock is smaller in these models, meaning that the derivative of the wage with respect
to the capital stock is larger. Hence, a small expected change in the economy's im-
plied future capital stock has a larger impact on the future expected wage and thus
a larger inuence on the consumption of workers.
For individual agents at specic ages the reshuing makes a big dierence for
all models under consideration. Indeed, in the case of variable policy the percentage
change in consumption at certain older ages caused by the reshuing averages close
to 30 percent. Interestingly, the two policies produce dierent age-specic reactions
to the reshuing indicating the importance of the policy regime for underlying con-
sumption behavior. In fact, with variable policy, the elderly now end up consuming
considerably more when assets are reshued reecting the fact that having assets last
longer in the economy means higher wages and, therefore, receiving higher gettings,
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on average, each year from the young. The elderly's consumption is also somewhat
higher, on average, when the policy involves xed taking. This may reect the higher
value, in a present value sense, arising from the xed annual receipts being implicitly
discounted at a lower time path of asset returns.11
3.6.2 Models With Bonds
In Table 3.4 and Figures 3.8{3.10 we consider 40-period models with a one-period
risk-free bond, risk aversion of 2, and with and without rare disasters.
3.6.2.1 40-Period Model: Consumption Co-movement Measures of Gen-
erational Risk
No Disaster No Disaster Rare Disaster Rare Disaster
No Bond With Bond No Bond With Bond
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
0.990 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.980 0.998 1.000 0.911 0.988 1.000
0.986 0.996 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.924 0.984 1.000 0.970 0.993 1.000
0.917 0.981 1.000 0.997 0.999 1.000 0.869 0.968 1.000 0.786 0.966 1.000
0.942 0.987 0.997 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.911 0.979 0.994 0.939 0.981 0.998
all agents: absolute % adjustment 0.347 1.495 2.656 1.318 1.493 1.658 0.015 1.523 5.595 0.001 1.517 4.336
Correlation Measures of Generational Risk, 40-Period Model with γ = 2
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Table 3.4: Measures of generational risk in the 40-period models with and without
rare disasters: summary statistics of pairwise correlations in percentage changes in
consumption among dierent age groups, and absolute percentage adjustments needed
to achieve full risk sharing.
Table 3.4 shows our three consumption co-movement measures of generational risk
with and without bonds. In all cases, average consumption co-movement correlation
coecients are very high, ranging from a low of 0:966 in the case of rare disasters and
11Since there is, in our base-case model, no term structure of interest rates, not even a short-term
bond market, the model involves no explicit discounting of future non-asset income ows.
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bond to a high of 0:999 in the case of no disasters and bond. The absolute percentage
adjustments average about 1:5 percent in all cases.
These results conrm that generational risk, even with rare disasters, is small.
Although a bond market reduces the range of adjustments needed to achieve full risk
sharing, it makes no dierence to the mean.
3.6.2.2 40-Period Model: Bond Demands and the Equity Premium
1       5       9       13      17      21      25      29      33    36    39
−5000
    0
 5000
10000
Average Bond Shares by Age (%)
No Disaster
Age
1       5       9       13      17      21      25      29      33    36    39
−5000
    0
 5000
10000
Average Bond Shares by Age (%)
Rare Disaster
Age
1       5       9       13      17      21      25      29      33    36    39
0
5
10
15
Average Assets by Age
No Disaster
Age
1       5       9       13      17      21      25      29      33    36    39
0
5
10
15
Average Assets by Age
Rare Disaster
Age
1       5       9       13      17      21      25      29      33    36    39
−40
−20
0
20
Average Bond Demand by Age
No Disaster
Age
1       5       9       13      17      21      25      29      33    36    39
−40
−20
0
20
Average Bond Demand by Age
Rare Disaster
Age
 Average Bond Shares, Assets, and Bond Demands by Age in 40−Period Model With and Without Rare Disasters
Figure 3.8: Average bond shares, assets, and bond demands by age in the 40-period
model with risk aversion of 2, with and without rare disasters. In the case of rare
disasters, the probability of disaster in 1:7 percent per year, and contraction size
during the disaster is 20 percent.
Figure 3.8 plots age-specic average bond shares, assets, and bond demands. It
shows that the young are the demanders of bonds, the youngest most so, and that
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the old are the suppliers. The gure also shows that rare disasters make no material
dierence to average bond demands.
The age pattern of bond holdings is intuitive since the young mainly live o of
uncertain wage income. On the other hand, the old live o the assets they have
accumulated and the income earned on these assets. But while the return on assets
is uncertain, the principal cannot be lost and, thus, is safe. Consequently, the old are
in a position to insure the young against productivity shocks by selling bonds to the
young and going long capital (stocks).
The counterpart of the old going long in stocks and short in bonds is that the
young go short in stocks and long in bonds. Indeed, the youngest of the young hold
close to an astounding 6; 000 percent of their assets in bonds. But since their assets
are themselves small, their absolute holding of bonds is reasonable.
To see this, note that the young short stocks to insure against an adverse shock in
z and the resulting decline in wage. Consider two scenarios. In one, the beginning-of-
period capital is equal to the average capital stock over 640 periods, 193:970, and z is
equal to the average z, 0:999, implying a wage of 1:239 and a rate of return on capital
of 0:094 per period. In the other, capital is again equal to its average value and z is
one standard deviation below average, at 0:967, implying a wage of 1:199 and a rate
of return on capital of 0:091. One measure of the young's potential loss in wages is
the dierence in wage between the two scenarios, 0:040. Since the dierence in the
rates of return on capital between the two scenarios is 0:003 and the average bond
demand of the youngest age group is 12:782, the youngest gain 0:038 in consumption
units when the adverse shock hits. Hence the potential capital gain covers most of
the loss.
Bond demands fall o sharply with age even though assets rise rapidly during the
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Figure 3.9: Bond shares and demands for selected age groups, and lagged total factor
productivity level (z), through time in the 40-period model with risk aversion of
2, with and without rare disasters. In the case of rare disasters, the probability of
disaster in 1:7 percent per year, and contraction size during the disaster is 20 percent.
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accumulation phase. To understand further the behavior of bond demand, we plot,
in Figure 3.9, bond shares and demands of selected age groups through time. Bond
shares of the two youngest age groups are the most volatile, while those of the oldest
age group exhibit very low volatility. This makes sense since when they are hit by
adverse shocks, the young suer heavy losses in the main source of their livelihood|
their labor income. And, because of persistence in the process for z's, when a bad
shock hits, the young insure themselves against further bad z's coming in the near
future by buying bonds and shorting stocks. Since the bond shares they hold in the
period after the bad shock reect the decisions they made in the period the shock
hit, we expect the correlation between the bond shares and lagged z's to be highly
negative.
Indeed, the correlation between the bond shares and lagged z's is  97:8 percent in
the model without rare disasters and  77:2 percent in the model with rare disaster for
the youngest age group. In the case of rare disasters, the gure reveals that the largest
spikes in bond shares coincide exactly with low lagged z's. However, the size of the
bond share spikes of the youngest also depends on their beginning-of-period assets.
If the largest bond share spikes are excluded from the calculation, the correlation
between the bond shares and lagged z's in the model with rare disasters is lower
 92:2 percent. The gure also reveals that bond demands of the young tend to drop
after rare disasters hit even though bond shares rise, consistent with the fact that
their investible assets are reduced. The old suer less from drops in z's; although
their capital gain is lower, their principal cannot be lost. This explains the lower
variability in their bond shares.
Figure 3.10 shows that the equity premium very small, regardless of the presence
of rare disasters. Although in both models bond returns are less volatile than stock
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Figure 3.10: Equity premium and rates of return on capital and on the riskless bond
in the 40-period model with and without rare disasters. In the case of rare disasters,
the probability of disaster in 1:7 percent per year, and contraction size during the
disaster is 20 percent. In all cases, risk aversion is 2.
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returns, on average bond and stock returns are virtually indistinguishable. In the
model with rare disasters, the average annual rate of return on capital is 0:0617
with standard deviation of 0:0034. The average annual bond return is 0:0616 with
standard deviation of 0:0027. In the model without rare disasters the equity premium
is even smaller. There, the average annual rate of return on both capital and bonds
is 0:0620,12 with standard deviations of 0:0021 for the stock and 0:0015 for the bond.
Hence, rare disasters do not explain the high risk-free rate in our model.
What explains the model's small equity premium? One answer is simply that
the risk arising from the productivity shock is not that large. But is this true? In
the model without rare disasters and with bond, the mean wage is 1:239, and its
standard deviation is only 0:048. But this ignores the persistence in the productivity
shock process. Discounting at the average risk-free rate, a one standard deviation
shock to the wage between the rst and second year of life produces a present value
loss in lifetime earnings of 0:236 or 1:74 percent of the average wage.13 This is non-
trivial. But there are three other considerations. One is that shocks are i.i.d. and will
likely average out over any worker's workspan. The second is that asset accumulation
provides an eective means to self insure against productivity shocks especially since a
negative productivity shock lowers today's capital formation, which raises tomorrow's
future return to assets. Evidence of this self insurance is provided by the rapid decline
in bond demand as workers age. The third is that there are ample number of elderly
willing to underwrite the insurance young workers seek at an aordable price. I.e.,
12The dierence becomes visible only in the sixth decimal place.
13To compute the present value loss in lifetime earnings we again consider two scenarios. In one,
the z equals the average z in the rst year of life, is one standard deviation below average in the
second year, and evolves according to (4.6) until retirement. In the other scenario, the z starts at
its average value in the rst year of life, and thereafter evolves according to (4.6). The earnings
loss each period is equal to the dierence in wage implied by that period's z in the two scenarios,
keeping the capital at its average value in both cases.
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they are willing to supply bonds at a low price (high return).
3.6.2.3 20-Period Model and the Variable Policy: Consumption Co-movement
Measures of Generational Risk
To study the eect of the bond market on generational risk when incomes of the young
and old are negatively correlated, we simulate a 20-period model with variable policy.
The countercyclical nature of the variable policy drives the correlation between the
net wage and the rate of return on capital down to  94:55 percent. Such highly
negatively correlated income risks leave scope for an improvement in risk sharing
with the introduction of the bond.
No Policy No Policy Variable Policy Variable Policy
No Bond With Bond No Bond With Bond
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
0.997 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.965 0.308 0.999 0.959 0.989 1.000
0.995 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.999 1.000 0.974 0.991 0.999
0.963 0.988 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.974 0.037 1.000 0.839 0.958 1.000
0.972 0.989 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.998 -0.960 -0.146 0.927 0.944 0.966 0.987
all agents: absolute % adjustment 1.577 3.023 4.426 2.759 3.022 3.259 0.000 6.062 22.879 4.278 5.935 7.626
Correlation Measures of Generational Risk, 20-Period Model with γ = 2
ρ ( % ∆ in C worker
i  
,  % ∆ in C worker
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C retiree
i  
,  % ∆ in C retiree
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C agent
i  
,  % ∆ in C agent
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C agent
i  
,  % ∆ in per capita C )
Table 3.5: Measures of generational risk in the 20-period model with and without
variable policy: summary statistics of pairwise correlations in percentage changes in
consumption among dierent age groups, and absolute percentage adjustments needed
to achieve full risk sharing. The rst 50 observations (i.e. the capital stock transition
period after the policies are introduced) have been dropped from all calculations.
In Table 3.5 we consider our three consumption co-movement measures of gen-
erational risk: pairwise correlations in percentage changes in consumption between
dierent age groups, correlations of each agent's percentage change in consumption
with the per capita consumption, and absolute percentage adjustments needed to
achieve perfect risk sharing. The two left-hand-side panels present the results in mod-
84
els without policy and with and without bonds. As before in the 80- and 40-period
models, they show that average consumption co-movement measures are very high
and the absolute percentage adjustments, while larger, are still modest. Moreover,
the improvement in risk sharing provided by the bond market is very limited.
The two right-hand-side panels present the results with variable policy, with and
without bonds. As discussed in the 80-period model, pairwise correlations in percent-
age changes in consumption among some workers are highly negative since the policy
turns good times into bad times for the workers, especially so for the youngest workers.
However, the bond market allows them to eectively share risks among themselves
and insure against positive z's. Indeed, the minimum across workers of their pair-
wise correlations in percentage changes in consumption increases from  96:53 percent
to 95:87 percent after the bond is introduced. The corresponding mean correlation
increases from 30:83 percent to 98:94 percent after the bond is introduced.
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Figure 3.11: Absolute percentage adjustments needed to achieve perfect risk sharing
for the 10th age group in the 20-period model with  = 2, with and without variable
policy.
Table 3.5 also shows that the bond reduces the volatility of absolute percentage
adjustments. This is especially so in the case of variable policy, where the minimum
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absolute adjustment of 0:00 percent and the maximum absolute adjustment of 22:88
percent are both far from the mean adjustment of 6:06 percent. After the bond is
introduced to the variable policy model, the spread of the minimum absolute adjust-
ment (4:28 percent) and the maximum absolute adjustment (7:63 percent) around the
mean absolute adjustment (5:93 percent) is much tighter. Figure 3.11, which plots the
adjustments through time for the tenth age group, illustrates this striking reduction
in volatility. Thus the bond market is important here, not to help agents hedge the
riskiness of the economy, but rather to oset the riskiness of the government policy.
3.6.2.4 20-Period Model and Variable Policy: Bond Demands and the
Equity Premium
Figure 3.12 plots average bond shares, assets, and bond demands by age. It shows that
the pattern of bond demands ips when variable policy is introduced. As predicted, in
the model with variable policy the young are insuring against the good times, which
is when they get hurt by the government. To see this, note that they short bonds.
They invest the proceeds of those short sales in stocks. Hence, when stocks do well,
the resulting higher government taking is oset by increased capital gains.
On the other hand, the old need to insure themselves against the bad times. When
adverse z's hit, the transfers they receive from the government are reduced. Moreover,
in the model with policy, the asset holdings of the old are lower than in the model
without policy, since in addition to their own savings they rely on the government.
Hence, in bad times their interest income is lower in the model with policy. So they
are the demanders of the bonds that the young supply.
Figure 3.13 plots the correlations, in percent, between the age-group-specic con-
sumption and the shock z. It shows that, unlike in the model without policy, in the
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Figure 3.12: Average bond shares, assets, and bond demands by age in the 20-period
model with  = 2, with and without variable policy.
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model with policy, bond positions of the young dramatically alter their correlations.14
Hence, the bond market provides a practical generational risk sharing mechanism in
the model with variable policy.
The eectiveness of bonds in insuring the young in the model with variable policy
is also evidenced by the fact that adding the bond market increases the volatility (the
standard deviation) of the capital stock from 0:693 to 1:018. This makes sense, since
the bond makes the good times even better and the bad times even worse for the
young, and hence increases the upside and lowers the downside of how much they can
save. In the model without policy the eect of the bond market on the volatility of
the capital stock is much less pronounced|it decreases from 1:399 to 1:264 after the
bond is introduced. This is consistent with our previous evidence of it playing a very
limited role in terms of risk sharing when income risks are positively correlated.
Despite all the risk sharing the bond accommodates in the model with variable
policy, the equity premium, computed as the average, across 640 periods, of the
dierence between the rates of return on the stock and the bond, remains small.
In fact, the equity premium of 9:64  10 6 in the model without policy is virtually
indistinguishable from that of 2:4110 5 in the model with variable policy. As before,
the reason is that the average risk-free rate is almost as high as the average rate of
return on capital: in the model with policy the average rates of return are 0:0818 for
the stock and 0:0817 for the bond, while in the model without policy they are 0:0620
for both the stock and the bond. Hence, uncorrelated income risks cannot explain
the equity premium puzzle in our model.
14The very rst age group enters each period without any assets or bond positions, hence the
bond does not ip the sign of the correlation of their consumption with the shock z with respect to
the model without bond.
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3.6.2.5 20-Period Model with High Risk Aversion and Rare Disasters:
Consumption Co-movement Measures of Generational Risk
To further investigate the equity premium puzzle, we simulate two more 20-period
models: one with very high risk aversion ( = 15) and another with a combination
of high risk aversion ( = 6) and rare disasters.
Correlation Measures of Generational Risk, 20-Period Model
No Disasters No Disasters Rare Disasters Rare Disasters
No Bond With Bond No Bond With Bond
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
0.80 0.93 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.81 0.93 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00
0.80 0.97 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.96 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
0.83 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
all agents: absolute % adjustment 0.00 1.61 3.86 0.96 1.63 2.75 0.01 2.15 6.48 0.13 2.16 4.22
γ = 15 γ = 15 γ = 6 γ = 6
ρ ( % ∆ in C worker
i  
,  % ∆ in C worker
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C retiree
i  
,  % ∆ in C retiree
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C agent
i  
,  % ∆ in C agent
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C agent
i  
,  % ∆ in per capita C )
Table 3.6: Measures of generational risk in the 20-period model with very high risk
aversion ( = 15) and no rare disasters, and with a combination of high risk aversion
( = 6) and rare disasters: summary statistics of pairwise correlations in percentage
changes in consumption among dierent age groups, and absolute percentage adjust-
ments needed to achieve full risk sharing. In the case of rare disaster, the probability
of disaster in 1:7 percent per year, and contraction size during the disaster is 15
percent.
Table 3.6 displays our consumption co-movement measures of generational risk for
each model, with and without bond. It shows that generational risk is very small to
start with, and that the bond has very limited eect in mitigating it. This is despite
the fact that the correlation between the wage and the interest rate is negative, as
reported in Table 3.7. However, unlike in the variable policy model, in these two
models the correlation between the wage and the z's is highly positive. It is 68:06
percent and 73:83 percent in the very high risk aversion model without and with
bonds, respectively, and 82:22 percent and 85:50 percent in the high risk aversion
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Income Risk Correlations, 20-Period Models
Model Correlation (%)
Policy Bond
2 No None No 37.20 93.06 93.06
2 No None Yes 45.36 94.22 94.22
2 No Variable No -94.55 99.52 -99.52
2 No Variable Yes -47.88 94.81 -94.81
15 No None No -53.54 68.06 68.06
15 No None Yes -42.08 73.83 73.83
6 Yes None No -31.52 82.22 82.22
6 Yes None Yes -18.60 85.50 85.50
γ
Rare 
Disaster
ρ( net w , r ) ρ( gross w , z) ρ( net w , z)
Table 3.7: Correlations of wage (where applicable, both gross and net of government
taking) with the rate of return on capital and the z's in various 20-period models.
and rare disasters model without and with bonds, respectively. At the same time,
the correlation of the rate of return on capital with the z's is also positive: 25:10
percent, 29:93 percent, 27:73 percent, and 34:83 percent in the very high risk aversion
model without and with bond, and in the high risk aversion with rare disasters model
without and with bond, respectively. Hence, both the young and the old suer in bad
times, and risk sharing opportunities are limited.
3.6.2.6 20-Period Model with High Risk Aversion and Rare Disasters:
Asset Demands and the Equity Premium
However, the old suer less than the young when bad shocks hit, as evidenced by
the lower correlations of rate of return on capital with the z's compared to the corre-
sponding correlations of wages with the z's. Hence, they are the demanders of bonds
in these two models, while the old are the suppliers, as Figure 3.14 shows.
The equity premium remains very small, at 5:3080 10 4 in the model with very
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Figure 3.14: Average bond shares, assets, and bond demands by age in the 20-
period model with very high risk aversion ( = 15) and no rare disasters, and with
a combination of high risk aversion ( = 6) and rare disasters. In the case of rare
disasters, the probability of disaster in 1:7 percent per year, and contraction size
during the disaster is 15 percent.
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high risk aversion and at 3:9004 10 4 in the model with high risk aversion and rare
disasters. Again, this is due to the high risk free rate: the average rates of return
are 0:1239 for the bond and 0:1245 for the stock in the  = 15 model, and 0:0845
for the bond and 0:0849 for the stock in the  = 6 with rare disasters model. Hence,
high risk aversion and rare disasters do not explain the equity premium puzzle in our
model.
The nding of small equity premia in a wide range of papers does not imply a
common explanation as the models used dier substantially with respect to the nature
of technology, preferences of agents, the horizons of agents, the number of periods, the
types of shocks, the presence of borrowing constraints, and the age-specic covariance
of equity returns and wages.15
In our model, equity premia appear to be small for three reasons. First, the
annual productivity shocks hitting the economy, while realistically calibrated, are
relatively modest even when rare disasters are incorporated. Hence, there is relatively
little intrinsic generational risk. Second, in models without variable policy, intrinsic
generational risk hits both the young and the old in similar ways. Rather than sharing
risks among themselves, agents self insure by saving and accumulating signicant
assets over the life cycle, i.e. they pool risk over time. While the return on these
assets is risky, the principle itself cannot be lost. Over time, as workers age, this
diminishes the demand for bonds as a way of securing sure resources. This explains
why the very young are most interested in buying bonds and the very old are more
interested in selling them. And third, articially inducing risk between the young
and the old via government policy elicits more net supply as well as net demand for
15Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), for example, assume the young have safe wages
and would be natural purchasers of stock and sellers of bonds were it not for borrowing constraints.
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bonds, by the young and the old respectively, leaving the risk premium essentially
unchanged.
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis
To assess the robustness of our nding of small generational risk, we also simulated
models with stochastic depreciation and a random walk specication of the technology
process.
3.7.1 Stochastic Depreciation
Although we view stochastic depreciation as a rather ad-hoc way of breaking the
positive correlation between stock returns and wages, we include it in the 20-period
model to see its impact on generational risk. Specically, we follow Ambler and
Paquet (1994) and specify the depreciation rate as a normal random variable with
quarterly mean, standard deviation, and covariance with the technology shock of
0:021, 0:0052, and  2:07  10 6. This produces correlations of  0:097 between the
wage and the rate of return on capital, 0:822 between the wage and the z's, and 0:078
between the rate of return on capital and the z's.16 The corresponding correlations
in the baseline 20-period model without depreciation are 0:372, 0:931, and 0:686.
Nevertheless, Table 3.8 reveals only a small increase in generational risk compared
to the baseline model without stochastic depreciation according to the consumption
co-movement measures. For example, the average across all agents of their correla-
tions in percentage changes in consumption is 0:883 which is only slightly smaller than
16Since we start the simulation from the non-stochastic steady state of the 20-period model without
depreciation, the rst 50 periods of the simulation represent the transition period during which the
capital stock moves to its new level. Hence, we exclude the rst 50 periods from the calculations of
the correlations and the generational risk measures.
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the corresponding 0:988 value from the baseline model without depreciation. And the
average percentage adjustment of 2:009 in the model with stochastic depreciation is
actually smaller than the 3:023 value in the baseline model, but the spread of the
adjustments is larger in the model with depreciation.
There are two reasons stochastic depreciation is less eective in generating genera-
tional risk than one might think. First, an X percent depreciation-induced reduction
in the stock of capital in period t will be mitigated, from the perspective of capital
owners, by increases in the marginal productivity of capital in period t+1 and there-
after. Second, the reduction in capital hurts workers via a reduction in the marginal
productivity of labor, i.e., in wages in this period and thereafter. Hence, there is
natural risk sharing arising via these general equilibrium eects.
3.7.2 Random Walk Technology
The technology process we considered so far is AR(1), hence mean reverting. To
attempt to produce more pronounced generational risks and see what implications
they might have across generations, we simulate a 20-period model with a random
walk specication of the technology process, viz.,
ln(zt+1) = ln(zt) + t+1; (3.21)
where t+1 is a normal random variable calibrated as in (4.6).
Table 3.8 again shows only a small increase in generational risk compared to the
baseline model: consumption correlations are now 0:847, on average, and the average
percentage adjustment is 3:119.
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Correlation Measures of Generational Risk, 20-Period Models with γ = 2, No Policy, and No Bonds
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
0.997 0.999 1.000 0.771 0.931 0.997 0.681 0.937 0.999
0.995 0.998 1.000 0.957 0.982 0.996 0.824 0.942 0.996
0.963 0.988 1.000 0.695 0.883 0.997 0.495 0.847 0.999
0.972 0.989 0.995 0.904 0.934 0.973 0.800 0.914 0.984
all agents: absolute % adjustment 1.577 3.023 4.426 0.000 2.009 12.792 0.002 3.119 11.653
No-Policy, Baseline 
Model
Stochastic 
Depreciation
Random Walk 
Technology
ρ ( % ∆ in C worker
i  
,  % ∆ in C worker
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C retiree
i  
,  % ∆ in C retiree
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C agent
i  
,  % ∆ in C agent
j 
)
ρ ( % ∆ in C agent
i  
,  % ∆ in per capita C )
Table 3.8: Measures of generational risk in 20-period models with stochastic depre-
ciation (and AR(1) technology) and random walk technology (and no depreciation):
summary statistics of pairwise correlations in percentage changes in consumption
among dierent age groups, and absolute percentage adjustments needed to achieve
full risk sharing. The rst 50 observations (i.e. the capital stock transition period
after stochastic depreciation or policy are introduced) have been dropped from all
calculations. The baseline model, included for comparison, is with AR(1) technology
and without depreciation. All models are without policy, without bonds, and with 
of 2.
3.7.3 The Small Gains from Fully Sharing Risk Among Living Genera-
tions
Our consumption co-movement measures of generational risk are less than fully satis-
fying because they do not clarify the expected utility gains from actually implement-
ing such risk sharing. Figures 3.15 and 3.16 do this. They present the compensating
dierentials for each cohort of newborns in the absence of such risk sharing arrange-
ments needed to achieve the same level of expected utility as in the presence of such
arrangements. The compensating dierentials are, as above, the common factor by
which one needs to multiply consumption levels along all paths of the economy absent
the envisaged risk sharing to produce the same expected utility as would arise with
the envisaged risk sharing.
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 Compensating Consumption Differentials Needed to Achieve Expected Utility with Perfect Risk Sharing
80-Period Model
Figure 3.15: Compensating consumption dierentials of newborns through time
needed to equate their expected lifetime utility in the original simulation to that
in the world with perfect risk sharing in the 80-period models. In models labeled \no
policy", \variable policy", \xed policy", and \proportional policy" the risk aversion
is 2 and there are no rare disasters; in the model labeled \high gamma" the risk aver-
sion is 5 and there are no rare disasters; in the model labeled \rare disaster", the risk
aversion in 2, the probability of disaster in 3 percent per year, and contraction size
during the disaster is 20 percent. The rst 75 observations (i.e. the capital stock tran-
sition period after policies are introduced) have been dropped from all calculations.
All models are without bonds.
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Figure 3.16: Compensating consumption dierentials of newborns through time
needed to equate their expected lifetime utility in the original simulation to that
in the world with perfect risk sharing in the 20-period models. The model labeled
\no policy" is our baseline model without policy, without depreciation, and with
AR(1) technology. The \stochastic depreciation" model is without policy and with
AR(1) technology, and \random walk technology" model is without policy and with-
out stochastic depreciation. The \variable policy" model is without stochastic depre-
ciation and with AR(1) technology. The rst 50 observations (i.e. the capital stock
transition period after stochastic depreciation or policy are introduced) have been
dropped from all calculations. All models are without bonds and with  of 2.
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To calculate expected utility with full risk sharing among the living we imagine the
following agreement made by each contemporaneous generation age 1 to 79 at each
point in time t that governs who will consume what at time t + 1. Each generation
takes the consumption it would do in the absence of the agreement as its threat point
and agrees to experience the same growth rate in consumption between t and t + 1
as everyone else, with aggregate consumption growth calculated as the percentage
change in the sum of threat point consumptions of those 1 to 79 at time t and the
sum of threat point consumptions of those age 2 to 80 at time t+ 1.
Note that by always consuming, in the aggregate, the total threat point level of
consumption, the economy's capital stock along its risk-sharing path always remains
the same as without the risk-sharing. In addition, each generation's assets in each
period will equal what it would otherwise have held in assets without the risk sharing
since if the agreement calls for them to consume less than they would otherwise
have done, they give up some of their current consumption rather than use up their
remaining assets. And if the agreement calls for them to consume more than they
would otherwise have consumed, they receive the additional consumption from their
contemporaries, not via a dissipation of their own asset holdings.
As Figure 3.15 shows, the expected utility gains from implementing full risk shar-
ing among those alive at any point in time are less than one tenth of one percent in
the 80-period model with no policy, xed policy, and proportional policy as well as
with no policy and high risk aversion or no policy and rare disasters.17 In the case of
variable policy, the gain to risk sharing does, for a few generations, exceed one half
of one percent.
Figure 3.16 repeats Figure 3.15, but for 20-period models with no policy, variable
17The values in the gure that are less than 1 reect, we believe, approximation errors.
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policy, stochastic depreciation, and productivity shocks that follow a random walk.
The results are very similar to those in the prior gure.
3.8 Conclusion
The theoretical literature on generational risk assumes this risk is meaningful and can
be shared by the government. To assess the validity of these assumptions this paper
develops, calibrates, and simulates 80-period, 40-period, and 20-period OLG models
with aggregate productivity shocks.
We nd that generational risk is overrated and illustrate how government take-as-
you-go policy can manufacture, rather than mitigate generational risk. We show that
the main determinant of the economy's future position is not the shocks it experiences,
but rather the manner and extent to which the government redistributes resources
across generations. We also demonstrate that bond markets can play an important
role in sharing risk across generations, including the generational risk arising from
government policy. Finally, we conrm in an OLG framework that equity premium
in simple neoclassical models is far smaller than that observed.
Previous solution methods could not handle large scale models such as ours due
to the well known curse of dimensionality. We overcome the curse by restricting
the model's solution to its ergodic set based on the suggestion of Marcet (1988)
and the associated solution algorithm developed by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2009,
2011). We extend the latter to include an inner loop to clear the bond market. This
paper demonstrates the practicability of constructing large-scale OLG models with
aggregate shocks in which generational policy matters as appears so evident in real
economies.
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Chapter 4
Valuing Government Obligations When
Markets Are Incomplete
4.1 Introduction
Assessing scal sustainability is tricky business. Governments commit to providing
specic goods and services over time. They also promise to make transfer payments to
current and future citizens. Some of these obligations are described as ocial. Others
are labeled unocial. But their economic costs don't depend on their titles. Instead
they depend on their size, timing, and reliability. Thus, unocial commitments can
have larger present values than equally sized ocial commitments if the unocial
commitments are more likely to be paid.
Take U.S. federal debt service and Social Security payments. U.S. debt repayment
to its worldwide holders is backed by lofty words, namely \the full faith and credit
of the U.S. government." Social Security benets, in contrast, are backed by the
political power of tens of millions of current and near-term American retirees, most
of whom routinely vote. Furthermore, Uncle Sam's debt service is a nominal dollar
commitment, and Uncle Sam can print money at will. His Social Security payments,
in contrast, are real (ination-indexed) commitments.
The decision to label government obligations as unocial, though economically
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arbitrary, is hardly innocent. It's used to keep liabilities o the book and, thereby,
understate what governments truly owe. Indeed, by making specic obligations, like
future pension payments or medical benets, non-fungible, governments ensure that
these I.O.U.s can't readily be priced.
How then can we determine the degree to which a government has promised more
than it can deliver? Stated dierently, how should we discount future government
obligations (including negative obligations, i.e., taxes), no matter their title, when
markets are incomplete? Relying on a social welfare function, i.e., on a social dis-
count rate, is a frequent practice as recently evidenced by the Stern Report's (2006)
valuation of the costs and benets of climate-change abatement. However, the sus-
tainability of government policy is a matter of economic feasibility, not ethics. And
whether any self-proclaimed social planner, applying his/her own \social" discount
rate, feels the expected path of government spending exceeds its cost will not illumi-
nate whether the policy is aordable.
This paper's answer is to determine the current wealth equivalent of future gov-
ernment promises using a familiar metric|the change in remaining expected lifetime
utility converted into current consumption units. Doing so is relatively straightfor-
ward for current generations. But what about future generations? Our approach is
to treat future generations as if they are already alive, but simply have no utility in
periods not just after, but also before their physical existence. Specically, we treat
a future generation that will materialize in x years as currently alive with an age
of minus x. We also assume this age-minus-x generation discounts (applies its time
preference rate to) utility when alive for another x years|i.e., by the number of years
it will take for the generation to be born.
Making these calculations requires fully characterizing the economy's general equi-
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librium in the presence and absence of the government's promises. Our vehicle is a
10-period variant of Hasanhodzic and Kotliko's (2013) 80-period life-cycle model
with aggregate risk. Like that paper, this study applies a numerical method origi-
nally proposed by Marcet (1988) and operationalized by Judd, Maliar, and Maliar
(2009, 2011) to overcome the curse of dimensionality. Their means to ban the curse
is to solve for decision functions only in states that fall within the economy's ergodic
space; i.e., for states that the economy will frequent, not those it will never visit.
Our life-cycle model features standard Cobb-Douglas production in capital and
exogenously supplied labor. There are random shocks to total factor productivity
and either random shocks to capital's rate of depreciation or adjustment costs as in
Hasanhodzic (2014). Preferences over the single commodity are time separable and
isoelastic. There is also a one-period bond market. The model is intentionally highly
stylized. Our goal is not to make realistic calculations, but to suggest, in the clearest
and simplest setting, how one might make such calculations.
We proceed by positing and then solving our model in the absence of any govern-
ment policy. Next we consider a sudden government promise at time zero to make
ongoing payments to retirees. Finally we solve the model assuming, counterfactually,
that the government has an external funder for these payments, named, well, God.
The question then is how much the government would need to extract at time zero
from each living and future generation to compensate it for not carrying through
with its God-assisted policy. The sum total of all these compensation amounts rep-
resents the country's scal gap. It tells us precisely the total current resources the
government is short when it comes to meeting, as in discharging, all its unfunded
commitments.
Our God-assisted general equilibrium assumes that God makes her payments as
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they come due. Clearly, prepayment by God would produce a dierent dynamic
stochastic equilibrium economy, dierent changes in lifetime expected lifetime utility,
and a dierent assessment of what the government owes. This might suggest a short-
coming in our approach since it's inherently sensitive to the economy policy that the
government promises, with God's help, to deliver. The sensitivity holds, but it's an
intrinsic and inevitable feature of scal sustainability analysis. One simply cannot
value government promises without knowing all they entail, including their general
equilibrium eects.
In this regard, an interesting focal equilibrium is one in which the government
is implicitly promising expected utility increases arising only from the provision of
old age payments and not inclusive of any general equilibrium feedback eects. We
calculate the value of these partial equilibrium promises as well.
When our calculated values of wealth-equivalent changes in expected utility are
positive, they can be expressed as equaling the discounted present value of the pay-
ment promises, with the discount rate chosen to equate the present value of the
promises to the compensating variation. The derived discount rates capture general
equilibrium changes when such changes are assumed to be incorporated in the gov-
ernment's promises. But in partial equilibrium our implied discount rates lets us
understand whether the short-term (one-period) bond rate comes close to the right
discount rate for valuing longer term government promises.
We nd that the discount rates for policies involving safe payments each period
to the elderly aren't uniform over agents of dierent cohorts when a new general
equilibrium is part of what the government is promising. In particular, discount rates
decline with age for the young and increase with age for the elderly. The general
equilibrium feedback eects are the key to these results. When agents anticipate
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future benets, they save less and the capital stock declines. The resulting decline
in wages hurts the young the most, lowering the value of the policy to them. If the
general equilibrium eects are suciently adverse, young and future generations can
be worse o. In this case, the compensating dierential of the generation in question
is negative and there is no discount rate that can be used to value future promised
benets, since these benets, inclusive of their general equilibrium eects, have a
negative present value.
Discount rates, when they are well dened, aren't uniform across states of the
world either. Indeed, for each age group, the discount rates are higher in bad states
of the world when the capital stock and productivity are low. In such states, the rate
of return to capital is high, i.e., the price of future consumption is low. This induces
agents to allocate more consumption into the future. Hence, the extra consumption,
in the form of the benet, does not matter as much to them.
When the benet is small, the general equilibrium eects are less pronounced and
there is less variation in discount factors across agents or states of the world. In fact,
when the benet is innitesimal, the discounting is very close to the risk-free rate
regardless of the age of the agent or the timing of the payment.
The model is solved using Hasanhodzic (2014), which is the rst to incorporate
stochastic depreciation and adjustment costs into the setting like this paper's. That
algorithm, in turn, closely follows that of Hasanhodzic and Kotliko (2013) at the
high level (see Chapter 3 for more detail).
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe the model and
its calibration. Section 4.4 presents results and Section 4.5 evaluates the accuracy of
solutions. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 The Model
The model features G overlapping generations with shocks to total factor productivity
and either capital depreciation shocks or capital adjustment costs. Each agent works
full time through retirement age R, dies at age G, and maximizes expected lifetime
utility. If there are adjustment costs, rms maximize their nancial value, i.e., the
present value of their revenue ow, otherwise they maximize static prots.
4.2.1 Endowments and Preferences
The economy is populated by G overlapping generations that live from age 1 to age
G. All agents within a generation are identical and are referenced by their age g and
time t. Each cohort of workers supplies 1 unit of labor each period. Hence, total labor
supply equals the retirement age R. Utility is time-separable and isoelastic, with risk
aversion coecient :
u(c) =
c1    1
1   : (4.1)
4.2.2 Technology
Production is Cobb-Douglas with output Yt given by
Yt = ztK

t L
1 
t ; (4.2)
where z is total factor productivity,  is capital's share of output, and Lt is labor
demand, which equals R, labor supply. Equilibrium factor prices are given by
wt = zt(1  )
 PG
g=1 g;t 1
R
!
; (4.3)
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rt = zt
 PG
g=1 g;t 1
R
! 1
  t; (4.4)
where depreciation t  N (; 2 ), as in Ambler and Paquet (1994).
With capital adjustment costs, r is given by
rt =
zt(
Kt
R
) 1 + m
2
( It
Kt
)2 + qt   qt 1
qt 1
; (4.5)
where qt = 1 + m
It
Kt
is the price of capital, Kt =
PG
g=1 g;t 1
qt 1
is the capital stock,
It = Kt+1  Kt is the investment at time t, and m is the adjustment cost parameter
(see, e.g., Auerbach and Kotliko, 1987 and the references therein).
Total factor productivity, z, obeys
ln(zt+1) =  ln(zt) + t+1; (4.6)
where t+1  N (0; 2).
4.2.3 Financial Markets
Households save and invest in either risky capital or one-period safe bonds. Investing
1 unit of consumption in bonds at time t yields 1 + rt units in period t+ 1. The safe
rate of return, rt, is indexed by t since it is known at time t although it is received at
time t+1. The total demand for assets of household age g at time t is denoted by g;t,
and its share of assets invested in bonds is denoted by g;t. Households enter period t
with g 1;t 1 in assets, which corresponds to the total assets they demanded the prior
period. Since investment decisions are made at the end of the period, the aggregate
supply of capital in period t, Kt, is the sum of assets brought by the households into
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period t, i.e.
Kt =
GX
g=1
g;t 1; (4.7)
normalized by qt 1 in the case of adjustment costs. Bonds are in zero net supply,
hence by being short (long) bonds, households are borrowing (lending) to each other.
4.2.4 Government
In the model with government policy, each retiree receives a benet equal to a xed
share  of either the average wage each period. The benets are assumed to be
externally nanced.
4.2.5 Household Problem
Households of age g in state (s; z; ) maximize expected remaining lifetime utility
given by
Vg(s; z; ) = maxc;; fu(c) + E [Vg+1(s0; z0; 0)]g (4.8)
subject to
c1;t = `1wt   1;t + (1  `1)Ht; (4.9)
cg;t = `gwt + [g 1;t 1(1 + rt 1) + (1  g 1;t 1)(1 + rt)] g 1;t 1   g;t (4.10)
+ (1  `g)Ht;
for 1 < g < G; and
cG;t = `Gwt + [G 1;t 1(1 + rt 1) + (1  G 1;t 1)(1 + rt)] G 1;t 1 (4.11)
+ (1  `G)Ht;
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where cg;t is the consumption of a g-year old at time t and Ht is the benet given
to the elderly, and (4.9){(4.11) are budget constraints for age group 1, those for age
groups between 1 and G, and that for age group G.
4.2.6 Equilibrium
At time t, the economy's state is (st; zt; t), with st = (1;t 1; : : : ; G 1;t 1) denoting
the set of age-specic asset holdings. Given the initial state of the economy s0; z0; 0,
where s0 = (1; 1; : : : ; G 1; 1), the recursive competitive equilibrium is dened as
follows:
Denition. The recursive competitive equilibrium is governed by the collection of
the value functions and the household policy functions for total savings g(s; z; ), the
share of savings invested in bonds g(s; z; ), and consumption cg(s; z; ) for each age
group g, the choices for the representative rm K(s; z; ) and L(s; z; ), as well as the
pricing functions r(s; z; ), w(s; z; ), and r(s; z; ) such that:
1. Given the pricing functions, the value functions (4.8) solve the recursive problem
of the households subject to the budget constraints (4.9){(4.11), and g, g, and
cg are the associated policy functions for all g and for all dates and states.
2. Wages and rates of return on capital satisfy (4.3) and either (4.4) or (4.5),
i.e. at each point, for given w and r the rm maximizes prots if there are no
adjustment costs and maximizes the rm value otherwise.
3. All markets clear: Labor and capital market clearing conditions are implied by
Lt = R and (4.7). Since bonds are in zero net supply, bond market clearing
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requires
GX
g=1
g(s; z; )g(s; z; ) = 0: (4.12)
Market clearing conditions in labor, capital, and bond markets and satisfaction
of household budgets imply market clearing in consumption.
Finally, for all age groups g = 1; : : : ; G   1, optimal intertemporal consumption
and investment choice satises
1 = Ez
 
1 + r(s0; z0; 0)
u0(cg+1(s0; z0; 0))
u0(cg(s; z; ))

(4.13)
and
0 = Ez [u
0(cg+1(s0; z0; 0))(r(s; z; )  r(s0; z0; 0))] ; (4.14)
where Ez is the conditional expectation of z
0 given z. Note that the endogenous part
of the state next period, s0, is determined by the asset demands chosen the period
before.
4.3 Calibration
The parameters are calibrated as follows.
4.3.1 Endowments and Preferences
We set  to 2. Agents work for 7 periods and live for 10. Hence, each period represents
6 years. We set the quarterly subjective discount factor, , at 0:99, as is standard in
the macroeconomics literature.
110
4.3.2 Technology
Quarterly values for  and  are 0:95 and 0:01, respectively, as estimated in the
empirical literature (see, e.g., Hansen (1985) or Prescott (1986)). Capital share of
output, , equals 0:33. In the model with stochastic depreciation, quarterly values for
 and  are 0:0123 and 0:0026, respectively. In the model with adjustment costs, as
well as in the base model without either stochastic depreciation or adjustment costs,
depreciation is zero. The adjustment cost parameter m is set to 10.
4.3.3 Government
The wage share, , equals 40 percent when the benet is large, 10 or 20 percent when
the benet is medium-sized, and 2 percent when it is small.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 General Equilibrium Discount Factors
Table 4.1 shows annual discount factors for each cohort in good and bad states of the
world, for dierent retirement benet sizes. The compensating variations that form
the basis of determining these discount rates are those needed to achieve the same
remaining lifetime expected utility in the no-policy general equilibrium as one would
enjoy in the general equilibrium arising under the externally funded policy.
In the good state the capital stock and the productivity shock are both high, while
in the bad state they are both low. The medium and the small benets amount to
20 percent and 2 percent of the average wage, respectively. Since the average wage is
estimated in advance (from a previous run of the simulation), both benets are sure.
Recall that to compute the discount factors we rst solve our model in the absence
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Page 1
Age 
Benefit Size
Medium Small
State
Good Bad Good Bad
Annual Discount Rates (%)
1 3.59 4.62 3.52 4.10
2 3.15 3.80 3.29 3.64
3 2.82 3.40 2.68 3.38
4 2.56 3.06 2.46 3.16
5 2.30 3.05 2.24 2.98
6 2.34 3.07 2.02 2.86
7 2.39 3.87 2.15 3.05
8 4.13 6.37 2.58 3.68
9 5.30 10.37 3.02 4.27
Risk-free rate
3.06 4.39 3.25 4.41
Table 4.1: Annual discount factors for each cohort in good (high capital, high TFP
shock) and in bad (low capital, low TFP shock) states of the world, for a medium-
sized sure benet (20 percent of the average wage) and a small one (2 percent of the
average wage).
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of any government policy. Next we consider a sudden government promise at time zero
to pay ongoing, externally nanced benets to retirees. Finally, for each generation,
we nd the amount by which we need to increase his time 0 assets to equalize his
expected lifetime utility in the world without policy to that in the world with policy.
From this we compute that generation's implied discount rate.
More precisely, let Fa denote the compensation an agent age a > 0 requires at time
0 when the policy is being evaluated in order to give up sure benets in retirement
(ages 8, 9, and 10). Then Fa =
Expected Lifetime Utility
u0(ca;0) , where the change in expected
lifetime utility is between the models without and with government policy. Dividing
by u0(ca; 0) converts changes in utils into changes in the economy's single good.
For an agent who is age a < 0 at time 0 when the policy is being evaluated, the
compensation Fa =
Expected Lifetime Utility
 aE[u0(c1; a)
Q
s(1+rs)]
, where s = 0; :::; a and rs is the random
return on capital. For those age 8 or under, the implied discount rate  is obtained by
solving Fa(0) = B=(1+ )
8 a+B=(1+ )9 a+B=(1+ )10 a, where B is the amount
of the sure benet received in retirement (age 8, 9, and 10). For those age 9 and 10,
there are 2 and 1 terms, respectively.
The table shows that the discount rates for policies involving safe payments each
period to the elderly aren't uniform over agents of dierent cohorts. In particular,
discount rates decline with age for the young and increase with age for the elderly.
The general equilibrium eects are the key to these results. When agents anticipate
future benets, they save less and the capital stock declines. The resulting decline
in wages hurts the young the most, lowering the value of the benets to them. The
further away the young are from the benets, the more they are hurt. The older
agents have fewer periods of higher rates of return on capital to enjoy, and the value
of the benet to them is smaller the older they are. Hence, the discount rate of the
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initial elderly age 9 exceeds the discount rate of the initial elderly age 8 and that rate
is higher than the discount rate of those initially age 7. The medium size benet is
large enough to materially reduce the marginal utility of consumption of the elderly.
This explains why we see very high discount rates for those initially age 9|rates that
are much higher than the risk free rate.
Discount rates aren't uniform across states of the world either. Indeed, for each
age group, the discount rates are higher in bad states of the world, where capital
stock and productivity are low. In such states, the rate of return on capital is high,
i.e., the price of future consumption is low. This induces agents to allocate more
consumption into the future, in which case the extra consumption, in the form of the
benet, does not matter as much to them.
Table 4.1 also shows that when the benet is smaller, there is less variation in
discount factors across agents or states of the world. The reason is that with smaller
benets, the general equilibrium eects are less pronounced.
4.4.2 Partial Equilibrium Discount Factors
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present discount factors in partial equilibrium, for dierent cohorts
and dierent timing of the benets. In Table 4.2 the policy is being evaluated in
a typical state of the world, while in Table 4.3 it is evaluated in an atypical state,
characterized by low capital stock and adverse productivity shock. The (row i, column
j) cell of each table is the discount factor associated with the amount an i-year-old
agent is willing to give up to get a sure benet when he is i+j years old. These discount
factors are computed as follows: Let Fa denote the amount an agent age a > 0 is
willing to give up at time t to get a benet at time t+ k. Then Fa =
kEu0(ca+k(t+k))
u0(ca(t)) .
This calculation is capturing how much agents require today in order to give
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low k,z
Page 1
Periods Till Benefit Received
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
C
u
rr
e
n
t
A
g
e
1 3.20 3.24 3.27 3.30 3.33 3.35 3.36 3.38 3.39
2 3.23 3.25 3.28 3.31 3.33 3.34 3.37 3.38
3 3.23 3.25 3.28 3.30 3.32 3.34 3.36
4 3.22 3.26 3.27 3.29 3.30 3.33
5 3.22 3.25 3.26 3.27 3.29
6 3.22 3.24 3.25 3.27
7 3.21 3.24 3.26
8 3.22 3.25
9 3.21
Risk-Free Rate
3.21
Table 4.2: Annual discount factors for each cohort starting in a typical state of the
world, when the benet is sure but innitesimal, so that there are no general equi-
librium feedback eects. The (row i, column j) cell is the discount factor associated
with the amount an i-year-old agent is willing to give up to get a sure benet when
he is i+j years old. The prevailing risk-free rate is 3:207 percent.
low k,z
Page 1
Periods Till Benefit Received
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
C
u
rr
e
n
t
A
g
e
1 4.39 4.21 4.13 4.04 3.97 3.90 3.84 3.78 3.75
2 4.41 4.23 4.14 4.04 3.97 3.90 3.82 3.77
3 4.52 4.31 4.19 4.08 4.01 3.91 3.84
4 4.57 4.35 4.21 4.11 4.01 3.92
5 4.58 4.35 4.21 4.07 3.99
6 4.54 4.35 4.10 4.00
7 4.76 4.35 4.14
8 4.42 4.22
9 4.27
Risk-Free Rate
4.57
Table 4.3: Annual discount factors for each cohort starting in an atypical (bad)
state of the world, when the benet is sure but innitesimal, so that there are no
general equilibrium feedback eects. The (row i, column j) cell is the discount factor
associated with the amount an i-year-old agent is willing to give up to get a sure
benet when he is i+j years old. The prevailing risk-free rate is 3:207 percent.
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up a sure benet in a specied period (not necessarily periods 8, 9, and 10) in the
future, analogous to the general equilibrium calculation above. However, unlike in
the general equilibrium case where the benet is sizeable and received in each period
in retirement, the partial equilibrium benet is innitesimal and received only at a
given point in time. Hence, the derivative of expected utility in the period in question
provides our measure of the change in expected utility. The implied discount rate 
is obtained by solving Fa = 1=(1 + )
k.
Table 4.2 shows that in partial equilibrium the discounting is very close to the risk-
free rate of 3:207 percent in the typical state of the world. The results hold regardless
of the age of the agent or the timing of the payment. Table 4.3 shows that discount
rates can deviate from the risk-free rate even in partial equilibrium when the policy
is being evaluated in an atypical state. In this case, at each cohort age, the larger is
the number of periods till the benet is received, the smaller is the discount factor,
i.e., the more the benets are valued by agents. This is intuitively what one might
expect. Giving agents something safe further out in time when their consumption is
less certain would be more highly valued than giving agents something safe sooner
when there is less uncertainty. But, in addition, the interest rate can be expected to
fall through time in Table 3 given we are starting the calculations out in a bad steady
state. So the results here may be reecting a decline in the expected term structure
of returns. This Table 4.3 factor|that interest rates will likely fall|does not arise
in Table 4.2 where interest rates are likely to rise.
4.4.3 Fiscal Gap
Table 4.4 shows the compensation amounts (Fa's) that the live and unborn cohorts
require in general equilibrium. The sum total of these amounts is reported in the
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Benefit State
Compensation Amounts (as Share of GDP)
Current Age
-10 -9 … -1 1 2 … 7 8 9 10
Small
Bad -0.01 -0.01 … 0.13 0.40 0.65… 1.99 2.23 1.65 1.04 13
Good -0.01 -0.01 … 0.18 0.48 0.72… 1.73 1.80 1.29 0.70 12
Large
Bad -0.07 -0.08 … 0.24 1.15 2.09… 5.87 5.40 4.54 2.71 38
Good -0.05 -0.07 … 0.49 1.63 2.65… 6.02 5.74 4.43 2.53 42
Fiscal Gap 
(as Share 
of GDP)
Table 4.4: Present value of compensation amounts in total and as share of GDP in
general equilibrium. Benets are provided in periods 8, 9, and 10. Small benet is
10 percent of the average wage. Large benet is 40 percent of the average wage.
last column of the table as share of GDP. It represents the country's scal gap, i.e.,
the total current resources the government is short when it comes to meeting all its
unfunded commitments. The results are shown for a good and a bad state of the
world, as well as for sure benets of dierent size. The small and large benets
amount to 10 and 40 percent of the average wage, respectively.
The scal gap is larger when the benet is larger, as is intuitive. It also depends
on the state of the world the economy is in: When the benet is large, it is larger
when the policy is being evaluated in the good state than in the bad state, and vice
versa when the benet is small.
The table also shows that for some unborn agents, the compensation amounts are
negative. In other words, these agents are willing to pay to get from down under
the scal burden. This makes sense, since the general equilibrium eects crowd out
investment and reduce future wages. The transition path takes time and the agents
born in the future suer the most from this drop in wages. In this case, the discount
factors are not well dened. This suggests that discounting at the risk-free rate for
these agents is inappropriate, and that the approach taken here for valuing the scal
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gap may be more reasonable.
4.5 Accuracy of Solutions
A satisfactory solution requires the generation-specic Euler equations (4.13) hold
out of sample, i.e., on a set draws for the shocks not used to compute the equilibrium
decision rules. Hence, for each model considered, the accuracy of solutions is tested
on a fresh sequence of z's and 's that is 60 times longer than the 640-period sequence
used in the original simulation. This test entails simulating the model forward on the
new path of shocks, using the original asset demand functions, g, and clearing the
bond market in each period. The out-of-sample deviations from full satisfaction of
the Euler equations,
(s; z; ) = Ez
 
1 + r(s0; z0; 0)
u0(cg+1(s0; z0; 0))
u0(cg(s; z; ))
  1; (4.15)
are computed for each period in the newly simulated time path and for each
generation g 2 1; : : : ; G  1.1 Finally, the average, across time, of the absolute value
of the deviations from Euler equations is computed for each generation. The largest
deviation is less than 1 percent.
4.6 Conclusion
The proper manner to discount government commitments when markets are incom-
plete and the general equilibrium is held xed is a longstanding question in economics.
1The out-of-sample test does not apply to (4.14) since the inner loop is rerun, i.e. (4.14) will hold
by construction.
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Of particular interest is whether the prevailing short-term real interest rates are appro-
priate for discounting longer-term, government sure net payment promises|promises
of future payments that are independent of the economy's state of nature. We nd
that the discount rates depend on the age of the agent, the state of the economy,
and the size and riskiness of the government promises. A related question is what
discount rate to use to value uncertain government promises, such as payments to
the elderly that are dependent on the state of the economy. We leave this for future
work.
Our method of assessing scal sustainability starts from a position of no existing
policy and considers the costs arising from new government payment promises that
have no funding source. But how could this method be used to assess scal sustain-
ability in models, as well as actual economies, with existing policies? The answer is to
value state-specic payments to agents that have no clear funding source. Take, for
example, a large cohort that is scheduled to retire and receive payments from a much
smaller cohort of young, but those payments, because of their size, aren't collectable.
The size of the scal imbalance can be measured either in terms of what it would
cost to a) immediately compensate the elderly for her promised benets to them or
b) endow young people with enough resources to compensate them for having to fund
these payments through time. There is nothing requiring these two present values
to be identical since with incomplete markets agents can dierentially value a given
payment being received and made.
In principle, our method of determining discount rates applicable to specic gov-
ernment payments, be they positive or negative (i.e., taxes) or safe or risky, could be
used to improve scal gap accounting. Governments can use a realistic version of this
model to value their obligations and quantify how much they would hurt dierent
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generations if they were to renege on their promises to them. Alternatively, they
can understand what burdens they will inict on generations they make pay these
obligations.
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